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Ce document utilise des données fiscales et démographiques pour calculer les changements dans 
les recettes du gouvernement engendrés par les ajustements dans le taux marginal d'imposition, et 
cela en mettant l’accent sur la fourchette d'imposition la plus élevée. La portée de l’étude est une 
sélection de pays de l’O.C.D.E.  Une analyse des changement de comportement des contribuables et 
des différentes alternatives dont le gouvernement dispose en termes de politique fiscale en 
suivaient. En fin, les possibles faiblesses dans des techniques de référence sont examinées en 
détail.  
 
Mots clés : Imposition, marginal, recettes, budget, revenu 
 
This thesis uses demographic and income tax data to calculate changes in government revenue 
following adjustments to marginal tax rates, with a focus on the highest tax bracket.  The study’s 
scope is a variety of O.E.C.D. countries.  An analysis of behavioral responses of tax payers and the 
options available to government in terms of taxation policy follows. Past measurement techniques 
are also scrutinized. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
A central question in the implementation of government programs is financing. 
A substantial part of revenue raised by most national and subnational governments in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) is through income tax.  Hence 
taxes are not only a part of fiscal policy via their direct effects on the economy.  They also underline 
all spending considerations.  Governments must decide not only which tax rates to set, but also how 
many deductions to allow, and how to balance personal, corporate, payroll and sales taxes. 
In terms of personal income taxes, one of the most important considerations is marginal tax rates – 
the percentage that the government will keep of the next dollar earned by an individual.  A 
simplistic model for calculating changes in government revenue is to multiply the average 
individual’s amount of income subject to the tax increase by the number of individual tax payers, 
and to multiply the result by the percentage point change in the marginal rate being implemented. 
Yet such a calculation would almost certainly be erroneous because it assumes away behavioural 
responses.  Individuals declare income subject to taxation and have a variety of possibilities to 
adjust such amounts - via working less, taking greater advantage of deductions and exemptions, 
controlling the timing of compensation, or engaging in illegal tax evasion.  Retirement and 
residency decisions may also be adjusted due to tax considerations.  Hence income declared will 
likely fall when taxes are raised, and rise when tax rates are cut. 
How revenue forecasting can take such behavioural factors into account is essential in the 
elaboration of accurate budgets, yet doing so effectively is extremely difficult. 
Although a large body of work exists on the case of the United States, the rest of the world has been 
examined in far less detail.  This thesis seeks to fill part of that gap, by looking at prospects for 
raising government revenue in Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.  Alternative techniques are used to make inferences 
about Chile and Finland, where the detail of data is more limited. 
This thesis proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews previous literature on government revenue 
estimation and the responsiveness of declared taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates.  
Section 3 combines measures of such responsiveness with other country-specific data to estimate 
how government revenue can be expected to change following adjustments to top tax rates.  Section 
4 experiments with parametric approximations as substitutes for empirical data on income 
distributions for countries where these are lacking.    
Finally, popular methods for estimating behavioural responses to changes in taxation rates are 
scrutinized.   Section 5 examines the bias in estimates of taxable income responses to changes in tax 
rates introduced by the omission of capital gains from measures of taxable income, a practice 
widespread in the literature.  Section 6 investigates the bias in estimates of such responses caused 
by not accounting for migration responses, another simplifying technique widely used.  Section 7 
concludes. 
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My findings are that parametric estimation methods of income distributions often work quite well 
and that the omission of capital gains from measures of taxable income may introduce substantial 
bias to published results.  However, I find no evidence of substantial migration responses to 
changes in top marginal tax rates. 
A recurring theme which is highlighted throughout this thesis is that governments are able to 
significantly influence how responsive taxable income is to changes in tax rates by way of 
availability of deductions and ease of tax avoidance.  This in turn heavily impacts the amount of 
revenue collected.  
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2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A)  An Equation for Estimating Changes in Government Revenue via Changes in Marginal Tax 
Rates 
Saez (2004) proposes a decomposition which predicts changes in government revenue in a single 
year following a change to the top marginal tax rate.  Thus only income which is taxed at the top 
marginal rate is examined.  Whether changes to income at the extensive margin (i.e. retirement 
decisions and migration decisions) are incorporated is discussed shortly. 
The equation is: 
Δrevenue = N • ΔEMTR • (z – ż) • {1 – ETI • [z/(z – ż)] • [EMTR/(1 – EMTR)]}  
Here, N is the number of taxpayers in the top marginal rate bracket (which is held constant as a 
simplifying assumption) and EMTR is the effective marginal tax rate, or the portion of an extra 
dollar of gross income which will be paid to the government.  z is the average taxable income for 
those in the top rate bracket, and ż is the level of taxable income where the top tax rate kicks in.   
Finally, ETI is the elasticity of taxable income for those in the top tax bracket. 
 
The E.T.I. is defined as the percentage change in reported taxable income for the average individual 
in the top income tax bracket when the marginal personal net-of-tax rate increases by 1%.  The net-
of-tax rate is in turn defined as 1 - (effective marginal tax rate), or as the amount of the next dollar 
earned which the taxpayer will be able to retain. 
 
Intuitively, the E.T.I. is simply a measure of the response of declared taxable income to changes in 
the portion of additional gross income that an individual keeps. 
 
It is noteworthy that equation (1) can be decomposed into a mechanical component (the term just 
to the left of the main parentheses) and a behavioural term (the part subtracted from 1 within the 
main parentheses).  The mechanical response is what the change to government revenue would be 
if the E.T.I. were zero, which is to say that taxpayers would not adjust their taxable income when 
marginal tax rates change.  The behavioural response incorporates adjustments of taxable income 
into revenue forecasting. 
 
Looking more closely at the behavioural response 
 
{ETI • [z/(z – ż)] • [EMTR/(1 – EMTR)]}                                                                    (2) 
 
we see that this term effectively skews the true measure of change in revenue from that of the strict 
mechanical response.  This can either lower increases in revenue or turn them into losses 
depending on the magnitude of the E.T.I. term. 
(1) 
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Examining the effects of the country-specific variables in detail, it is clear that increases in average 
taxable income and decreases in the level of income where the top tax rate kicks in will raise the 
mechanical change in revenue collected. 
 
In terms of behavioural responses, using algebraic analysis we can see that all else held constant, 
increases in the E.T.I. will increase behavioural responses.  This is also true for the E.M.T.R. and the 
income threshold for where the top marginal tax rate kicks in.  The opposite is true of the level of 
average taxable income of those in the top tax bracket. 
 
Hence we see that raising the average taxable income of those in the top tax bracket will 
unambiguously cause government revenues to increase at a faster rate.  The same is true for 
policies that cause the E.T.I. to fall.  As the E.M.T.R. increases, the rate of increase in government 
revenue will fall, with government revenue falling if equation (2) exceeds zero. 
 
Finally, the situation becomes ambiguous for changes to the income level where the top marginal 
tax rate takes effect.  Decreases in this variable cause both the mechanical and behavioural terms in 
equation (1) to increase, and so the net effect on the change in revenue collected following a 
decrease in ż can only be determined by taking into account the values of all the variables in the 
equation. 
 
Revenue is maximized when equation (2) equals 1, which is to say that raising the marginal tax rate 
further will cause revenue to fall. 
 
Such a revenue-maximizing E.M.T.R. is referred to as the Laffer rate.  A Laffer response is defined as 
tax hikes causing government revenue to fall due to the E.M.T.R. being above the Laffer rate.  A 
Laffer curve is a graphical representation of the relationship between E.M.T.R.s and total 
government revenue.   
 
  
5 
 
Giertz (2009) uses equation (1) to estimate revenue-raising prospects for the U.S.  Table 1 
reproduces his results: 
Table 1 
Consequences of Various Values of the Elasticity of Taxable Income on American Taxation Policy 
Top Marginal Taxation Rate Bracket – 2005  
(As Calculated by Giertz (2009)) 
 
Elasticity of Taxable 
Income 
Percentage of Potential Revenue Gains 
Lost to Behavioural Responses 
Laffer Rate 
0 0.00 1.000 
0.2 24.55 0.775 
0.4 49.13 0.634 
0.6 73.56 0.536 
0.8 98.06 0.464 
1 122.53 0.410 
E.M.T.R. for Top Income Bracket in 2005: 0.407 
Income cut-off for top marginal rate: $326,451 
Average income of those in the top marginal tax bracket: $740,481 
 
An increase in the E.T.I. of just 0.2 is associated with an additional 12 to 24 percentage points of 
expected revenue gains lost to behavioral responses.  The Laffer rate falls very quickly as the E.T.I. 
rises, by as much as 22.5 points for a 0.2 increase in the E.T.I. 
 
B) The Challenges of Estimating the Elasticity of Taxable Income 
Returning to the characteristics of the E.T.I., there are several important points which should be 
considered. 
 
Generally, E.T.I.s are estimated for the short to medium term, as identification is extremely difficult 
in the long term due to a plethora of factors which could confound the results.   These range from 
recessions to changes in the economic outlook for specific industries, as well as time-varying 
impacts of control variables in the regression equation for the E.T.I. (Saez, Slemrod & Giertz 
(2012)).  This however imposes limitations on the accuracy of estimates for the present value of 
future revenue when looking at the long term.  We therefore need to recognize that present abilities 
to forecast revenue are restricted to the medium term at best. 
 
Lindsey (1987) provided a modern introduction to E.T.I.s, with Feldstein (1995) popularizing the 
topic further. Their estimates were very high compared to more contemporary findings, in the 
range of 1 to 3 for the general population, implying that the U.S. was on the wrong side of the Laffer 
curve. 
 
Lindsey’s approach was to use repeated cross sections of taxpayers to predict what income 
distributions would have been like in 1982 had the tax schedule remained the same as in 1979.  He 
then associated any deviations from the predicted income distribution as being due to behavioural 
responses to the tax reforms of 1981.   
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Feldstein was the first to estimate the E.T.I. using traditional panel data.  This involved a collection 
of 4000 non-stratified, randomly selected tax returns he obtained from the I.R.S. for the years 
around the tax reduction of 1986.  His high estimates were largely driven by the reactions of the 57 
taxpayers in his sample who were subject to the highest marginal rates of 1985, and whose taxable 
income varied significantly over the period studied.  Whether reliable inferences about large groups 
of taxpayers can be made from the behavioural responses of 57 individuals is not clear. 
 
In addition to the small number of high-income taxpayers in the sample used by Feldstein, his 
estimation method was called into question for several reasons that also concerned the work of 
Lindsey (1987): 
 
First is mean reversion, which applies at the individual level.  Those with very high incomes are 
much more likely to experience significant reductions in earnings in the future which are unrelated 
to taxation.  Life cycle issues (average incomes peak at a certain age before declining) also fit into 
this category.  Without proper controls this would bias the estimates of E.T.I.s downward for tax 
reductions, and upward for tax increases (Auten & Carroll (1999)). 
 
Second, those at the top of the income distribution have on average been experiencing faster 
increases in their income than have the rest of the population, both in nominal terms and in 
percentages.  This is almost certainly due to factors other than income tax.  Without controlling for 
such factors, E.T.I. estimates will be biased upward for tax cuts and downward for tax hikes.   
Although the sign of the bias due to high income trends is the opposite to that of mean reversion, 
there is no reason to believe that the two factors will cancel (Saez (2004)). 
Endogeneity of the net-of-tax rate also arises, a case of simultaneous equations.  Due to the federal 
tax system’s progressivity, marginal tax rates increase with income.  Assuming that the true value of 
the E.T.I. is not zero, we therefore have correlation of the explanatory variable with the error term.   
In order to isolate the impact of taxes on taxable income, tax rates should be imputed based on an 
instrumented measure of taxable income.  Auten & Carroll (1999) proposed as an instrument the 
predicted change in net-of-tax rates assuming that inflation-adjusted income remains the same as 
in the base year.   
 
Higher income groups often have more opportunities to control their taxable income.  This is 
through choosing methods of compensation (personal income vs. corporate income, salary vs. 
equity), or choosing the timing of compensation (delaying being paid until after a reduction in 
marginal rates, and advancing their pay in anticipation of an increase in marginal rates).  Hence it 
has been commonly proposed that the E.T.I. varies by income bracket, with the highest values 
corresponding to the highest earners (Gruber & Saez (2002), among many others). 
 
The solution of Auten & Carroll (1999) for mean reversion and income share trends was to include 
a control for base-year income, using differencing to eliminate bias from time-constant omitted 
variables.   
7 
 
 
Their results were drastically lower than Lindsey (1987) and Feltstein (1995), with an E.T.I. 
estimate of 0.55 for the population as a whole. 
 
Feldstein (1995) and Auten & Carroll (1999) excluded capital gains from their definition of taxable 
income, a technique which has been repeated in most studies on the matter since.  However, it is 
not clear whether the assigned marginal tax rates used are those that would apply to the level of 
income with or without capital gains, with Feldstein (1995) and Auten & Carroll (1999) not 
addressing this point explicitly.  Auten & Carroll in particular argued that those with high 
proportions of capital gains in their income are required to file using Alternative Minimum Tax 
calculations.  Since data on such individuals are not generally available in panel form, they posited 
that such an omission from taxable income should not have a significant impact on results obtained 
from commonly-used panel data sets.   
 
We should also attempt to control for the personal tax base, which is defined as the portion of 
national income which is subject to personal taxation.  This is embodied by the availability of 
deductions on tax returns.  More deductions result in a narrower tax base.   
 
Changes to marginal tax rates are often accompanied by changes to said tax base.  Tax cuts may be 
justified by an accompanying elimination of deductions in an effort to make the reduction in rates 
revenue neutral.  Tax hikes may be accompanied by extra deductions in an effort to reduce the 
impact of the increases on certain groups.  Thus isolating the effects of marginal tax rates on 
declared income is challenging (Slemrod & Kopczuk (2002)). 
 
Kopczuk (2005) argues that with a very broad tax base the E.T.I. for even the highest income 
bracket is only about 0.17, roughly a third of previously accepted estimates.  He does this by 
including the fraction of income subject to taxation as a control variable for tax bases.  This micro- 
level variable is thus far the strongest attempt at finding a proxy to control for the macro-level tax 
base. 
 
The results of Kopczuk (2005) show that the E.T.I. is influenced by policy.  Hence governments can 
reduce its value by eliminating deductions and thereby broadening the tax base. 
 
Turning to illegal tax evasion, Chetty (2009b) develops a utility maximization model for agents 
incorporating engagement in illegal sheltering activities.  He concludes that governments have a 
large amount of control over the impacts of tax evasion.  His model shows that the marginal 
revenue lost to increased tax evasion can on average be exactly recuperated via optimal audits.  For 
this to hold, a risk neutrality assumption for taxpayers is required.  The point stressed is that 
estimates of revenue lost to increases in marginal tax rates do not include revenue later 
recuperated in audit. 
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Chetty (2009c) demonstrates that taxpayers’ reactions to large rate changes are relatively much 
larger than to small rate changes.  The implication is that elasticity estimates based on small rate 
changes will be much lower than those based on larger changes. 
 
Classical theory predicts bunching at the kink points in the taxation structure, defined as the limit 
before a new tax rate kicks in.  We should therefore observe evidence of behavioural responses via 
bunching.  Saez (2010) finds evidence of this mainly in terms of cut-off rates for the earned 
employment refundable tax credit, a reaction concentrated among the self-employed.  There is also 
a certain amount of bunching at the level of income where taxation starts.  Quite surprisingly, he 
finds no evidence of bunching at any other kink points.  Bastani & Selin (2011) find similar results 
for Sweden. 
 
Further to these developments, Le Maire & Schjerning (2012) use Danish data to show that the self-
employed retain earnings in their companies, keeping their taxable income just below the cut-offs 
to avoid entering another income tax bracket.  In fact, of an overall estimated E.T.I. of 0.5 for the 
self-employed, only 0.14 to 0.2 is structural.  The rest of the reaction is simply income shifting (or 
smoothing) from one year to another.  Taxpayers who do not have self-employment income do not 
exhibit bunching behaviour in these results. 
 
Through all of these results, we see that the more opportunities for tax evasion (legal or otherwise), 
the higher the value of the E.T.I., further reinforcing the findings of Kopczuk (2005). 
 
C) Responsiveness of Capital Gains Realizations to Changes in Tax Rates 
Of the quite limited work in this area, Auerbach (1988) uses time series data to establish that there 
are significant short run elasticities of reported capital gains to changes in the taxation thereof.  
However, estimates of permanent behavioral responses were not statistically different from zero. 
 
Auerbach, Burman & Siegal (1997) use panel data to show that long run elasticities of capital gains 
realisations to net-of-tax rates for capital gains are indeed very low, with little avoidance behaviour 
aside from temporal shifting of the realisations themselves. 
 
Section 5 of this thesis undertakes further research on this topic. 
 
D) Migration and Evidence of Behavioural Responses at the Extensive Margin 
Despite the large majority of E.T.I. research focusing on the U.S., there has been relatively little 
research on state marginal tax rates and their effects on migration between states, with even less 
on migration between countries.  However, progress has been made in certain areas. 
 
The earliest published work is that of Feldstein & Valiant (1994), who posit that states cannot 
redistribute income via state income taxes.  This is since taxpayers can move between states.  Their 
conclusion has, however, been contradicted by empirical research over the years. 
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Knapp, White & Clark (2001) use a nested logit model to find that higher state income tax rates 
decrease emigration rates.  They explain this as income taxes being a proxy for public services.  
However, income brackets are not differentiated, so it could be that only the residence decisions of 
the very wealthy are affected by state income tax rates.  Such a result could be hidden by an 
offsetting number of people moving to the state to take advantage of better public services as the 
very high income earners leave.  Net in-migration would show as positive under such 
circumstances.   
 
Bahl,  Martinez-Vazquez, & Wallace (2002) go on to find evidence that states with higher tax rates 
tend to have higher salaries, which could also help explain the surprising results of Knapp et al. 
 
Bakija & Slemrod (2004) look at the migration induced by state level estate taxes, and although a 
small correlation is found, it is not large enough to significantly impact revenue levels.   
 
Conway & Houtenville (1998, 2001) show a negative causal relationship of marginal tax rates on 
net state migration of the elderly.  However, Conway & Rork (2005) argue that the causal effect is 
more likely to be the other way around.  States with influxes of seniors tend to adjust fiscal policy to 
accommodate them.  This result is found through time variability in migration patterns and estate 
taxes, with the young as a control group.  There could however be a causal effect of estate taxes on 
the migration rates of the very rich elderly. 
 
Coomes & Hoyt (2008) examine the effects of state income tax rates on those living in metropolitan 
areas that span at least two states.  Oddly, marginal net-of-state-tax rates have an impact on net 
migration rates only in states that decide residence based on state of employment (so-called states 
without reciprocity, which include such metropolitan areas as Chattanooga, Kansas City, Memphis, 
New York, Philadelphia, and St. Louis).  They hypothesize that this is because there is a larger 
difference in state tax rates between states without reciprocity.  The percentage increase in net 
migration to a 1% change in net-of-tax rates is estimated to be around 0.4% for those living in 
multi-state spanning metropolitan areas in states without reciprocity.  They further estimate that a 
1% increase in sales taxes is estimated to reduce net migration to the state by 0.35%. 
 
Bruce, Fox & Lang (2010) find evidence of inter-state transferring of income, but this is done via 
trusts (a common financial instrument allowing income to be taxed in another jurisdiction) and not 
migration.  This is seen through differences in federal adjusted gross income and calculated tax 
bases at the state level, since income received through a trust appears on tax returns at the federal 
level, but not on the return of the state of residence.  
 
Young & Varner (2011) numerically estimate the elasticity of migration to state income tax rates by 
examining the introduction of a ‘millionaire tax’ in New Jersey.  That is, the percent change in net 
migration of the wealthy to New Jersey following a 1% change in their net-of-state-tax rate.  Their 
estimates are in the order of 0.1.  
 
10 
 
Looking at Canadian data, Day & Winer (2006) examine the effects of provincial tax rates on 
migration between provinces, and find very little evidence of a causal effect.  Factors such as 
economic and (in the case of Quebec) political situations are by far the most important factors.  As 
with many such studies, they do not differentiate between income brackets.  So again, it could be 
that only the highest income individuals, a very small percentage of the population, are influenced 
to a significant degree by tax rates when choosing their province of residence. 
 
Milligan & Smart (2013, 2014) find evidence of income shifting between provinces as a reaction to 
provincial tax rates, but as with Bruce, Fox & Lang (2010) this is mostly done through trusts, and 
not physically moving. 
 
Kirchgassner & Pommerehne (1996) and Liebig, Puhani & Sousa-Poza (2006) study internal 
migration in Switzerland and its reaction to tax rates at the canton level, and find very little 
evidence of substantial sensitivity.  They do however find evidence of migration by young, college 
educated citizens.  These results are stated to be too small to significantly impact revenue 
collection.  The study does not comment on the long term fiscal implications of canton-level 
migration of the young, however. 
 
Kleven, Landais, Saez & Schultz (2014) find highly elastic responses of very skilled immigrants to 
Denmark to reductions in tax rates of recently arrived, highly skilled workers.  Their estimates are 
of the order of 1.5 to 2.  
 
The first paper to deal directly with inter-country migration caused by marginal tax rates is 
Sanandaji (2012), who uses information publicly available in Forbes to examine the migration 
behaviour of billionaires.  He finds that the main circumstances of migration of the super-rich are to 
go from a poor country to a richer one, and to move to countries with political and cultural ties.  
However, he finds that most billionaires stay in their home countries, with taxes having a minor 
impact on their choices of residence.  A caveat is that he only examines physical migration, and not 
the flight of capital. 
 
Finally, Kleven, Landais & Saez (2013) study the migration of European soccer players between 
leagues and its correlation with net-of-tax rates.  Interestingly, the vast majority of players choose 
to play in their own countries, with little impact from local fiscal policy.  The exception is more 
skilled (and highly paid) players, who show very high elasticities of migration to net-of-tax rates of 
approximately 1, compared to 0.15 for domestic players.  
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3. PREDICTING GOVERNMENT REVENUE 
 
A) Data Necessary for Estimates of Revenue Lost to Behavioural Responses 
In order to apply equation (1) to estimate government revenue responses to changes in marginal 
tax rates, we need estimates of five different parameters. 
 
The E.T.I. is the most challenging parameter on which to obtain data.  The best source is the large 
volume of articles which have been written specifically to estimate E.T.I.s for a variety of countries.  
However, the techniques used by the authors vary considerably, with some being more rigorous 
than others.  Most follow one of the three popular regression models outlined in the appendix. 
 
The specifics of various estimates of the E.T.I. for a variety of countries are summarized in table 3.  
 
After obtaining estimates for the E.T.I. for each country of interest, the other pieces of data 
necessary to apply equation (1) are values for EMTR, z (the average income of those in the top 
marginal tax rate bracket), ż (the income cut-off to be subject to the top marginal tax rate) and N 
(the number of taxpayers facing the top marginal tax rate). 
 
Data on E.M.T.R.s are available directly from table I.7 of the tax database of the O.E.C.D., as are 
values for cut-offs to be in the top marginal tax bracket. 
 
Getting estimates of average incomes for those in the top bracket and the number of people subject 
to the top rate is trickier.  The closest data available generally come from the World Top Incomes 
Database (W.T.I.D.).  It contains values for the cut-offs to be in the top 10, 5, 1, 0.5, 0.1 and 0.01 
percent of income earners for a variety of countries.  It also contains average incomes for each of 
these brackets. 
 
The first step to obtain estimates of z and N is finding the percentage of top income earners 
corresponding to the group which is subjected to the top marginal tax rate.  
 
After choosing the percentile whose cut-off is closest to that of the top marginal tax rate from 
among the income percentiles available on the W.T.I.D., I construct a quadratic interpolation.  The 
other points are the next higher and lower percentiles for which data are available from the W.T.I.D, 
along with their income cut-offs.   
 
The corresponding quadratic equation gives us an estimate of the percentage of the population 
subject to the top tax rate.  Multiplying by the population gives the estimate of N.  
 
A similar process, but with average incomes in place of income cut-offs, gives an estimate of z. 
 
An exception to this is for New Zealand, where the level of detail of data available from Statistics 
New Zealand permits direct calculation of N and z. 
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The year of most current data varies by country in the W.T.I.D.  Table 2 summarizes this, and shows 
corresponding E.M.T.R.s and other fiscal data. 
Table 2 
Comparison of Fiscal Data Available from the W.T.I.D. across O.E.C.D. Countries 
   
Country Year of Most 
Current 
Demographic 
Data 
Highest Effective 
Marginal Tax 
Rate in That Year 
Average Income in 
the Top Tax 
Bracket ($U.S.)* 
Income Cut-Off to 
Enter the Top Tax 
Bracket ($U.S.)* 
Canada 2010 0.464 207,441.80 105,477.06 
Denmark 2010 0.561 82,323.92 53,343.07 
France 2004 0.550 154,279.22 88,229.96 
Germany 2008 0.475 884,765.8 313,188.66 
New 
Zealand** 
2012 0.380 79,903.34 47,614.80 
Norway 2011 0.478 155,511.92 87,437.44 
Spain 2012 0.520 972,069.83 443,849.92 
Sweden 2013 0.567 107,306.09 67,821.9 
Switzerland 2010 0.414 370,067.60 180,350.72 
United 
Kingdom 
2012 0.520 478,831.64 215,753.79 
*Dollar figures are adjusted for purchasing price parity 
** Data comes from Statistics New Zealand 
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B) Results 
The results suggest that even small differences in the estimated values of E.T.I.s can have enormous 
impacts on lost revenue.  Combining published E.T.I. estimates with the tax situation at the time of 
the policy change studied, maximum and minimum values for the percentage of potential increases 
in revenue lost to behavioural responses following a rise in marginal tax rates are presented in 
figure 1: 
Figure 1  
Maximum and Minimum Percentages of Potential Increases in Revenue Lost to Behavioural Responses 
Based on Published Estimates of the Elasticity of Taxable Income 
 
Based on these results, many countries could be on the wrong side of the Laffer curve. That is, they 
could raise substantial amounts of revenue by lowering tax rates.  For the most extreme cases, a 1% 
reduction in top marginal tax rates would cause revenue collected from those in that income 
bracket to rise by 4%. 
In table 3 on the next page, I turn to full results for potential revenue losses for each country 
studied, as well as corresponding Laffer rates and details of data used in the estimates.  
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References to equations in table 3 are found in the appendix. 
E.T.I. estimates for countries with the highest tax rates (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) are 
consistently low, of the magnitude 0.05 to 0.5.   
Still, the percentage of revenue lost to behavioural responses is substantial, at more than 25% for 
even a small E.T.I. of 0.05 in the case of Denmark. 
Immediately noticeable is the large degree in variation in E.T.I. estimates, not just between 
countries but at times within a single country.  Institutional factors such as availability of 
deductions, cultural attitudes towards government or degrees of enforcement such as audits should 
explain at least part of this difference.  However, methodology issues such as the regression model 
and corresponding assumptions made as well as the quality of data almost certainly play a role.  
Specifics are presented in the appendix. 
Laffer rates for such countries are often substantially above the E.M.T.R.s of the period studied, 
suggesting that governments had a window for raising further revenue, political and welfare 
considerations aside. 
E.T.I. estimates vary substantially, not only across countries but at times across different studies for 
the same country.  Different estimating methods are a likely explanation for this, each with its own 
assumptions and weaknesses.  Common estimation methods are summarized in the first part of the 
appendix. 
A general weakness in the data is that almost all estimates are based around tax cuts, with little 
done using data on tax increases.  This is likely due to a global trend to lower tax rates which began 
in the early 1980s, the same period in which detailed data was first collected.  
We see that estimates published in the last ten years have used substantially larger sample sizes, 
producing much more precise results.  There is a general trend of high quality data becoming 
available across a range of European countries over the last decade. 
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Figure 2 shows the potential revenue increases lost to behavioural responses for a variety of 
countries for several plausible values of the E.T.I.: 
 
Figure 2 
Percentages of Potential Increases in Revenue Lost to Behavioural Responses for Various Values of the 
Elasticity of Taxable Income – Top Tax Brackets 
 
Years of data as per table 2  
 
The progression of the percentages lost relative to E.T.I.s is as expected given that such percentages 
are proportional to the E.T.I. 
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Figures 3 to 5 present behavioural responses and Laffer rates for Canada, Germany and Sweden.   
Figure 3 
Potential Revenue Lost to Behavioral Responses & 
Estimates of Laffer Rates - Canada 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  
Potential Revenue Lost to Behavioral Responses &  
               Estimates of Laffer Rates - Germany 
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Figure 5  
Potential Revenue Lost to Behavioral Responses &  
               Estimates of Laffer Rates - Sweden 
 
Although the percentage of mechanical revenue gains which are lost to behavioral responses varies 
greatly across countries, the Laffer rates are more consistent.   
 
Further algebraic analysis of equation (1) shows that changes in N have no effect on the 
relationship between the E.T.I. and the percentage of increases in revenue lost to behavioral 
responses: 
 
Δrevenue = N • ΔEMTR • (z – ż) • {1 – ETI • [z/(z – ż)] • [EMTR/(1 – EMTR)]} 
 
We have that 
 
i) N • ΔEMTR • (z – ż) is the mechanical revenue response 
 
ii) N • ΔEMTR • (z – ż) • ETI • [z/(z – ż)] • [EMTR/(1 – EMTR)] is the behavioral response 
or the amount of potential revenue lost.  
  
iii) Therefore the percentage of revenue gains lost to behavioral responses is simply ii/i, or 
ETI • [z/(z – ż)] • [EMTR/(1 – EMTR)].  N does not appear. 
 
iv) Finally, [z/(z – ż)] • [EMTR/(1 – EMTR)] is the slope of the blue lines in figures 2 to 4. 
  
As the E.M.T.R. gets larger, the slope of the line corresponding to percentage revenue gains lost for a 
given value of the E.T.I. gets steeper.  This is also true for decreases in z and increases in ż. 
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Hence for a given value of the E.T.I., countries that have higher percentages of potential revenue 
gains lost to behavioral responses either have a higher E.M.T.R., a lower average income for those in 
the top tax bracket, or a higher cut-off to be in the top income tax bracket.  Raising average income 
for those in the top tax bracket will raise government revenue by increasing potential revenue to be 
collected.  The percentage of revenue lost to behavioral responses will fall.  The situation is similar 
when lowering the cut-off to be in the top tax bracket.  
We can see these effects visually in figure 6 for a choice of 4 countries with noticeable differences in 
the percentages of revenue lost to behavioral responses: 
Figure 6 
Comparison of Potential Revenue Lost to Behavioral Reactions across Countries 
 
Following the above the discussion, it is clear that the driving forces behind the variations across 
countries comes from differences in marginal tax rates, average incomes in the top tax bracket, and 
the level of income where the top marginal tax rate kicks in.  Quantifying how much of the variation 
is due to each of these factors is more challenging. 
 
A natural strategy would be to take partial derivatives of equation (2) with respect to each variable 
of interest. However, this strategy is confounded by the average income of those in the top tax 
bracket being dependent on the income cutoff to be in the top tax bracket.  The higher the cut-off, 
the higher the average income of those left in that group.  Unfortunately, the relationship between 
these factors is very difficult to measure without having the exact shape of the income distribution 
for the country in question.  Making further approximations to get around this issue could lead to 
false inferences about which factors have the most impact. 
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It is perhaps preferable to simply assume that the two are independent, which should be 
approximately true in small neighbourhoods around the observed values. 
 
Table 4 presents partial derivatives evaluated at the most current data points available for the four 
countries of figure 5, without considering the E.T.I.: 
 
Table 4 
Partial Derivatives of the Equation for Percentage of Revenue Lost to Behavioural Responses  
Taken With Respect to Its Influencing Factors 
Evaluated at Most Current Values of Each Variable 
 
Partial Derivative W.R.T. Canada Denmark Sweden  Switzerland 
z -8.80 x 10-06 -8.10 x 10-05 -5.70 x 10-05  -3.50 x 10-06 
ż 1.73 x 10-05 1.25 x 10-04 9.01 x 10-05  7.26 x 10-06 
EMTR 7.08 14.74 14.50  5.68 
 
We see that generally, the values for all partial derivatives are higher for Denmark and Sweden than 
for Canada and Switzerland.  The values for the partial derivatives w.r.t. z and ż are easily 
comparable, as they are of the same units.  However, it is not obvious how to compare them to the 
values w.r.t. the EMTR.  
 
Table 5 makes an attempt in this sense by examining ratios: 
 
Table 5 
Ratios of Partial Derivatives of the Equation for Percentage of Revenue Lost to Behavioural Responses  
Taken With Respect to Its Influencing Factors 
Evaluated at Most Current Values of Each Variable 
 
 Canada Denmark Sweden  Switzerland 
ż/z -1.97 -1.54 -1.58  -2.05 
EMTR/z -806316 -181607 -254452  -1604616 
EMTR/ ż 409984 117674 160824  782002 
 
 
Here we see that in Denmark and Sweden the effective marginal tax rate and income cut-offs for the 
top tax bracket exert much less influence on the percentage of revenue lost to behavioural 
responses relative to the average income of those in the top tax bracket.  Hence we can expect that 
the lower average incomes of those in the top tax bracket in Denmark and Sweden relative to other 
countries is what drives their potential for large percentages of income lost to behavioural 
responses. 
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An equation for the Laffer rate is 1/{[(z•ETI)/(z- ż)]+1}.                               (3) 
 
From this, we can see that decreasing the E.T.I., decreasing the cut-off to be in the highest income 
tax bracket, or increasing the average income of those in the top marginal tax bracket will raise the 
Laffer rate.  Hence we expect those countries with the highest Laffer rates to have the lowest E.T.I., 
lowest cut-off for the top income tax bracket, or highest average income for those in that bracket.   
Countries with the highest tax rates such as Denmark and Sweden have the lowest Laffer rates, with 
Sweden’s being 0.2690 for an E.T.I. of 1.  This implies that the Scandinavian model of high tax rates 
and a wide variety of services is dependent on low E.T.I.s to function.   
Figures 7 and 8 present a visual representation of Laffer rates: 
Figure 7 
Comparison of Laffer Rates across Countries 
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Figure 8 
Comparison of Laffer Rates across Countries 
Restriction to Higher Values of the E.T.I 
 
This section concludes with a collection of Laffer curves showing how total revenue collected from 
the top tax bracket changes with the top marginal tax rate under several different values of the 
E.T.I.   
Since for E.T.I. = 0 we simply have the mechanical component of the increase in revenue from a 
change in top marginal tax rates, such Laffer curve are always linear.   
For positive values of the E.T.I., the Laffer curve becomes the standard hill, although it is somewhat 
skewed to the right.  It gets flatter and lower for higher values of the E.T.I., and the top of the curve, 
corresponding to the Laffer rate, moves to the left and is reached at a lower E.M.T.R.   
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Figure 9  
Laffer Curves for Various Values of the E.T.I. - Canada 
 
The last three figures, 10 to 12, show a direct comparison of Laffer curves across countries.  By 
raising the Laffer rate, a country collects more tax revenue per taxpayer in the top tax bracket when 
measured in U.S. dollars and adjusted for purchasing power parity. 
Figure 10 
Comparison of Laffer Curves across Countries 
E.T.I. = 0.2 
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Figure 11 
Comparison of Laffer Curves across Countries 
E.T.I. = 0.4 
 
Figure 12 
Comparison of Laffer Curves across Countries 
E.T.I. = 0.6 
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4. WORKING WITH LESS DETAILED DATA 
A) Introduction 
The results presented thus far are exclusively for high income countries. 
To examine issues related to raising tax revenue for low and middle income countries, a serious 
difficulty is limited availability of data.   
Most income data on such countries are usually in the form of average incomes or income shares by 
grouped percentiles.  Details of income distributions necessary to perform detailed studies on 
revenue collection and behavioural responses are not available. 
This is particularly true of the highest income individuals.  Inferences about their incomes cannot 
be meaningfully approximated from data on average incomes per population decile.  Yet high 
income individuals present the largest behavioural responses to taxation, and are the source of a 
large portion of government revenue.  
Getting around these limitations would allow us to obtain very interesting results, given the lower 
marginal tax rates generally in place in middle and low income nations. 
For instance, Hourton (2012) provides income cut-off information per decile of the population in 
Chile using the Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN) for 2006.  This is a 
mandatory survey issued by the government of Chile, and is the most reliable information on 
household income available to academics.  However, since income data is based solely on amounts 
reported in the survey, inaccuracies relating to reporting errors by high income households present 
a serious challenge. 
Putting such inaccuracies aside, once we have some information on income cut-offs in the income 
distribution, a feasible way to make inferences about those at the top of the income distribution is 
to look for ways to fit known income distribution functions to the limited data available. 
One example was presented in Dagum (1977).  He proposed a density function as follows: 
f(y) = (1-α)λβδ•y-δ-1(1+λ•y-δ)-β-1 for income y > 0                                                                         (4) 
To obtain the percentage of the population subject to the top tax rate, we use the Dagum CDF, given 
by: 
F(y) = α + (1-α)/(1+λ•y-δ)β , λ > 0                                                                                                          (5) 
Its inverse is given by: 
y = λ1/δ{[(1-α)/(p-α)]1/β-1}1/δ                                                                                                                (6) 
where p > α is the probability of having an income less than or equal to y. 
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To obtain estimates of the average income for those in the top income tax bracket, we need to 
integrate the inverse of the CDF.  The area of integration is from the percentage of the population 
subject to the top income tax rate to the top of the income distribution.  Numerical estimation 
methods for the integral present one possible way forward. 
An alternative approach which is explored in this thesis is developed in Saez, Slemrod & Giertz 
(2012).  They recognize that the right tail of an income distribution is well approximated by a 
Pareto distribution.  This has by definition a density function of the form f(z) = C/z1+α.  Denoting by 
zm the average income of those in the top bracket and ż the income level where the top marginal tax 
rate kicks in, they point out that we have zm = ∫zf(z)dz/∫f(z)dz, where the range of both integrals is 
from ż to infinity.  This expression is in turn equal to ż•α/(α-1), where in the results it is no longer 
necessary to know the value of C.  Hence, once the value of the Pareto α is known, assuming it is 
greater than 1 we can obtain an estimate for the average income for those in the top marginal tax 
bracket. 
In order to obtain the required estimate of the Pareto α, we can look at a second functional form 
used to approximate income distributions, presented by Champernowne (1952).  The density 
function is given by: 
f(y) = (2Nασsinϴ(y/y0)ѱ/(y(1+σ)ϴ{1+2cosϴ(y/y0)ѱ+(y/y0)2ѱ})                   (7) 
where ѱ = α when y > y0 and ѱ = ασ otherwise. 
Champernowne (1952) shows that the above parameter α converges asymptotically to the Pareto 
parameter α of the right tail of the income distribution in question, which is the α discussed just 
above.  Hence, once we have an estimate of α for the Champernowne formula above, we can quickly 
calculate an estimate of the average income of those in the top tax bracket. 
Note that the Dagum α has no direct connection to the Champernowne/Pareto α, and is designated 
by the same symbol by convention only. 
In terms of techniques to estimate the parameters of the two income distribution functions given 
above, Campano (2006) provides an iterative program which selects a set of parameters for either 
the Dagum or Champernowne formulas so as to minimize the CHI square.  The selection is taken 
from a collection of approximately 20,000 of the most likely combinations of such parameter 
values. 
B) Revenue Forecasts Using Income Distribution Function Extrapolations  
The goal of what follows is to investigate the potential of the Dagum, Champernowne and Pareto 
distributions in order to make inferences about underlying income distributions of nations that do 
not have a rich source of data readily available.  
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Returning to the case of Chile, we obtain the following: 
Table 6 
Income Distribution Results for Chile 2006 
 
E.T.I. (Fernandez 2010) 2.0 
Source of population data Hourton (2012) 
Dagum α 0.011312 
Dagum β 1.3582 
Dagum λ 0.67674 
Dagum δ 1.6586 
Champernowne α 1.5897 
Champernowne ϴ 0.008422 
Champernowne y0 8911.3 
Champernowne σ 1.2737 
ż (Income cut-off for top M.T.R.) U.S. $124,100 
Estimate of percentage of the population subject to top M.T.R. via Dagum C.D.F.  1.3773 
N (number of people in the top tax bracket) 171,149 
z (average income of those in the top tax bracket) via Pareto U.S. $334,545 
z via integration of Champernowne inverse C.D.F. U.S. $311,743 
Top marginal tax rate 40.00 
% revenue lost to behavioural responses via Pareto distribution method 211.96 
% revenue lost to behavioural responses via integration of the Champernowne 
inverse C.D.F. 
221.52 
Laffer rate via Pareto distribution method 23.92 
Laffer rate via integration of the Champernowne inverse C.D.F. 23.13 
 
The E.T.I. estimate comes from Fernandez (2010), who also uses the CASEN for 1996 to 2006 to 
obtain an estimate for Chile of 2.0.  It is not possible to tell how much her estimates were influenced 
by reporting biases in the survey, as this estimate is very high. 
Included in table 6 are estimates of the average income of those in the top tax bracket via 
integration of the Champernowne formula’s inverse CDF function, as provided by Fred Campano. 
We can see that since the Pareto method may over-estimate top average incomes in this case, it 
provides a lower estimate of the potential percentage of revenue lost to behavioural changes. 
The very high income cut-off for the top tax rate relative to average incomes heightens concern 
about the accuracy of the survey-based data.  Since this is quite a small portion of the population, 
reporting errors by a subset of the group could have large impacts on both the E.T.I. estimate and 
the calculations of lost revenue. 
28 
 
Figure 13 summarizes potential lost revenue and Laffer rates for a range of more moderate E.T.I. 
values: 
Figure 13 
Potential Revenue Lost to Behavioral Responses &  
               Estimates of Laffer Rates - Chile 
 
Interestingly, potential revenue lost to behavioural responses for a given value of the E.T.I. is lower 
than many richer nations already studied.  This is at least somewhat foreseeable due to the high 
average incomes of those in the top tax bracket and the discussion in section 3.  
I now turn to Finland as an additional example of this method.  Unlike Chile, Finland does not suffer 
from a lack of data generally.  However, Statistics Finland only releases income distribution data in 
tabulated form by decile.  Additionally, the W.T.I.D. (which was the source of income data in section 
2) lacks detailed information on this country. 
Mattika (2014) uses panel data involving 550,000 tax returns per year for the period 1995 to 2007 
to obtain a plausible estimate of the Finnish E.T.I. of 0.475.  The data cover the entire income 
distribution, and he presumes that the E.T.I. is applicable to all income groups, a strong assumption 
found frequently in the literature. 
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Using the Pareto method, we obtain the following results: 
Table 7 
Income Distribution Results for Finland 2007 
 
E.T.I. (Mattika (2014)) 0.475 
Source of population data Statistics Finland 
Dagum α 0 
Dagum β 0.87654 
Dagum λ 445620 
Dagum δ 4.0003 
Champernowne α 4.0619 
Champernowne ϴ 0.0988 
Champernowne y0 25467 
Champernowne σ 0.88932 
ż €64,006.20 
Percentage of population in the top tax bracket 2.268 
N 99,610 
z €84,910.28 
Top marginal tax rate 56.1 
% revenue lost to behavioural responses 246.56 
Laffer rate 34.14 
 
Although the top marginal tax rate in Finland is comparable to other Nordic countries, the much 
higher E.T.I. estimate results in a very large amount of revenue predicted to be lost to behavioural 
responses. 
The higher value of the Pareto/Champernowne α relative to that of Chile fits with expectations that 
wealth inequality is not as extreme in Finland, as shown by a ‘skinnier’ right-hand tail of the income 
distribution. 
The much smaller value of the Dagum α relative to Chile also gives less cause for concern in terms 
of the Dagum model’s fit of the entire income distribution.  The Dagum distribution function can be 
expected to give meaningful inferences over very nearly the entire income distribution. 
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Figure 14 presents Laffer rates and lost revenue for Finland.  Noteworthy are the lower Laffer rates 
and higher percentages of lost revenue, consequences of a lower top bracket income cut-off and 
lower average income in that bracket. 
Figure 14 
Potential Revenue Lost to Behavioral Responses &  
               Estimates of Laffer Rates – Finland 
 
 
As a third example, the tax reform of New Zealand in 1990 makes for an interesting study.  At that 
time, the government of New Zealand instituted a tax schedule which was very nearly flat, 
especially in comparison to other industrialized nations.  The top tax rate was set to 33%.  The level 
of income where the top rate kicked in was NZ$30,875, or just over US$18,000. 
The study of New Zealand presented in section 3 focused on a period when the country had 
returned to a more progressive tax structure. 
Although very detailed income distribution data is made publicly available by Statistics New 
Zealand, these go back only to 2001.  Earlier years’ data were never released.   
However, Dixon (1996) uses the Household Economic Survey of New Zealand to tally income 
summaries for those who were working. 
The Pareto distribution characteristics discussed above are assumed only to hold at the right tail of 
the income distribution, hence the technique is not applicable in this case.  The Dagum formula 
predicts 31.8% of the population was subject to the top M.T.R., a group which is far from being 
constrained to that right-hand tail. 
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Instead, integrating the Champernowne formula’s inverse CDF, we obtain the following the results: 
Table 8 
Income Distribution Results for New Zealand 1990 
 
E.T.I. (Thomas (2007)) 0.52 
Source of population data Dixon (1996)* 
Dagum α 0 
Dagum β 3.0967 
Dagum λ 51.212 
Dagum δ 1.7389 
Champernowne α 2.0146 
Champernowne ϴ 143.24 
Champernowne y0 32558 
Champernowne σ 0.49088 
ż NZ$30875 
Percentage of population in the top tax bracket 31.800 
N 829742 
z 50299 
Top marginal tax rate 33.0 
% revenue lost to behavioural responses 66.32 
Laffer rate 42.62 
*Data only covers those who are employed 
Thomas (2007) used publicly unavailable panel data for the late 1980s and early 1990s to estimate 
an E.T.I. of 0.52., focused on labour income. 
It is worth noting that using the estimate for the Pareto α to calculate the average income of those in 
the top income tax bracket gives a value of $61,305.72, an increase of over 20% compared to the 
integration method. 
The estimated value of Pareto α obtained from the Champernowne α implies a more unequal 
wealth distribution than Finland, but less than Chile.  This is in line with expectations.  Additionally, 
large amounts of revenue are lost to behavioural responses with even a relatively modest estimate 
of 0.52 for the E.T.I. 
Figure 15 presents Laffer rates and percentages of lost revenue for New Zealand during this period.  
The low value of the cut-off for the top income tax bracket allows us to predict the relatively low 
Laffer rates and percentages of lost revenue, again by way of the discussion in section 3. 
The remainder of the figures in this section show the relationship between Chile and richer nations 
in terms of potential lost revenue and Laffer rates.   
Specifically, figures 16 and 17 compare potential lost revenue and Laffer rates across countries, 18 
looks at revenue per top-bracket taxpayer for the case of Chile, and 19 and 20 compare such 
revenue per top-bracket tax payer across countries.  Tables 9 and 10 examine which are the driving 
forces behind variations across countries.  
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Figure 15 
Potential Revenue Lost to Behavioral Responses &  
               Estimates of Laffer Rates - New Zealand 1990 
 
Figure 16 
Comparison of Potential Revenue Lost to Behavioral Reactions across Countries 
 
  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.00%
50.00%
100.00%
150.00%
200.00%
250.00%
300.00%
350.00%
400.00%
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
La
ff
e
r 
R
at
e
In
cr
e
as
e
 in
 R
e
ve
n
u
e
  L
o
st
 t
o
 B
e
h
av
io
u
ra
l 
R
e
sp
o
n
se
s
Elasticity of Taxable Income
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
400%
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
In
cr
e
as
e
 in
 R
e
ve
n
u
e
  L
o
st
 t
o
 B
e
h
av
io
u
ra
l R
e
sp
o
n
se
ss
Elasticity of Taxable Income
Chile
New Zealand 1990
Sweden
Switzerland
33 
 
 
Table 9 
Partial Derivatives of the Equation for Percentage of Revenue Lost to Behavioural Responses  
Taken With Respect to Its Influencing Factors 
Evaluated at Most Current Values of Each Variable 
 
Partial Derivative W.R.T. Chile New Zealand  
1990 
Sweden  Switzerland 
z -2.80 x 10-05 -2.20 x 10-05 -5.70 x 10-05  -3.50 x 10-06 
ż 3.73 x 10-05 3.66 x 10-05 9.01 x 10-05  7.26 x 10-06 
EMTR 11.53 5.49 14.50  5.68 
 
Sweden is again highest in all values.  The fact that Chile and New Zealand have such large 
differences in the category for marginal tax rates for top earners again suggests that average 
incomes in the top tax bracket may be very influential in how much potential revenue is lost to 
behavioural responses.  
 
Table 10 
Ratios of Partial Derivatives of the Equation for Percentage of Revenue Lost to Behavioural Responses  
Taken With Respect to Its Influencing Factors 
Evaluated at Most Current Values of Each Variable 
 
 Chile New Zealand 
1990 
Sweden  Switzerland 
ż/z -1.31 -1.68 -1.58  -2.05 
EMTR/z -405029 -252474 -254452  -1604616 
EMTR/ ż 309067 149945 160824  782002 
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Figure 17 
Comparison of Laffer Rates Across Countries - Restriction to Higher Values of the E.T.I. 
 
Figure 18 
Laffer Curves for Various Values of the E.T.I. - Chile 
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Figure 19 
Comparison of Laffer Curves across Countries 
E.T.I. = 0.2 
 
Figure 20 
Comparison of Laffer Curves across Countries  
E.T.I. = 0.6 
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C) Testing Goodness of Fit 
As a final point on this topic, I turn to the issue of how well the Dagum and Champernowne 
functions can be expected to fit the true income distributions. 
Although Campano (2006) provides some analysis on this issue, comparing the fit of these 
distributions at the national level across countries is not one of his focal points. 
Because of the lack of a central source for income distribution data, it is quite difficult to find 
information on both decile income cut-offs such as those used above to estimate the Dagum and 
Champernowne parameters, and detailed data on incomes in the right-hand tail of income 
distributions.  Together, these two sets of data could be used to check how well the Dagum and 
Champernowne functions estimated with income data by population decile fit the true distribution 
of the right hand tail. 
The income data used in previous sections to obtain direct estimates of revenue lost to behavioural 
responses were usually obtained through the World Top Incomes Database, which does not provide 
detailed information about the population outside of the top 10% of earners.  
I have, however, found both types of data for certain years for Canada, Germany and New Zealand. 
The data provides information on average incomes and income cut-offs for various percentiles of 
the population. 
I begin by restricting the data to that of population deciles, and estimate corresponding parameter 
values for the Dagum and Champernowne distributions. 
Table 11 
Income Distribution Function Parameter Estimates 
Testing for Goodness of Fit 
 
Country Canada Germany New Zealand 
Year 2009 1998 2011 
Currency used Cdn $ Euros NZ $ 
Source of data Hunter, Sanchez & 
Douglas (2012) 
Bach, Corneo & Steiner 
(2006) 
Statistics New Zealand 
Dagum α 2.3965X10-9 0.053145 1.0694X10-7 
Dagum β 0.57937 0.21045 0.28513 
Dagum λ 156.55 5182.5 161.4 
Dagum δ 2.4957 5.2898 2.9703 
Champernowne ϴ 7.9591X10-12 161.12 9.6338X10-11 
Champernowne α 2.6513 0.90685 3.4603 
Champernowne y0 6956.7 37236 49104 
Champernowne σ 0.61288 0.5453 0.30254 
  
After obtaining the parameter estimates, I use income cut-offs available from the data and the 
Dagum income distribution to predict the percentage of the population with incomes above that 
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cut-off (denoted ‘Predicted %’ in the preceding tables).  I then compare the results to the true 
percentage of the population with income above the cut-off according to the data (denoted 
‘Observed %’ in the preceding tables).  ‘Difference’ refers to the predicted percentage minus the 
observed percentage. 
Next, I use the technique discussed previously and the estimate of Pareto α from the 
Champernowne distribution to estimate average incomes for those in the observed percentiles just 
analysed (denoted ‘Predicted income average’).  The corresponding true average incomes are 
available from the data.  I then divide the predicted average income by the observed average 
income of the data, putting it into percentage form.  The column ‘Percent difference’ is simply the 
result subtracted from 100. 
Negative estimates are explained shortly after the tables presenting the results. 
The results are a test of how well the predictions from the above techniques could be expected to fit 
the true underlying values of z and N. 
Table 12 
Goodness of Fit Results for Canada 2009 
(Figures in Canadian Dollars) 
 
Income 
cut-off 
Observed 
% 
Predicted 
% 
Difference Observed 
income 
average 
Predicted 
income 
average 
Percent 
difference 
140,000 10.00 10.71 0.71 248,110 224,781.69 9.40 
179,400 5.00 6.17 1.17 335,475 288,041.68 14.13 
301,975 1.00 1.79 0.79 647,454 484,846.07 25.11 
 
Table 13 
Goodness of Fit Results for Germany 1998 
(Figures in Euros) 
 
Income 
cut-off 
Observed 
% 
Predicted 
% 
Difference Observed 
income 
average 
Predicted 
income 
average 
Percent 
difference 
64,900 10.00 4.52 -5.48 116,050 -631,826 644.44 
83,600 5.00 1.31 -3.69 159,300 -813,877 610.91 
162,700 1.00 0.04 -0.96 367,700 -1,583,945 530.77 
551,900 0.10 0.00 -0.10 1,435,100 -5,372,952 474.40 
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Table 14 
Goodness of Fit Results for New Zealand 2011 
(Figures in New Zealand Dollars) 
 
Income 
cut-off 
Observed 
% 
Predicted 
% 
Difference Observed 
income 
average 
Predicted 
income 
average 
Percent 
difference 
72,000 9.97 10.20 0.23 117,493.70 101,264.72 13.81 
75,000 8.96 9.26 0.30 122,466.90 105,484.09 13.87 
78,000 8.02 8.42 0.40 127,818.00 109,703.45 14.17 
82,000 6.98 7.44 0.46 134,945.80 115,329.27 14.54 
87,000 5.94 6.41 0.47 143,789.10 122,361.54 14.90 
93,000 4.95 5.39 0.44 154,544.00 130,800.27 15.36 
101,000 3.98 4.33 0.35 168,722.90 142,051.90 15.81 
113,000 2.99 3.18 0.19 189,278.90 158,929.36 16.03 
131,000 2.01 2.10 0.09 222,135.00 184,245.54 17.06 
170,000 1.00 1.00 0.00 297,006.10 239,097.26 19.50 
Note: Data from Statistics New Zealand is grouped by amount of income in thousand N.Z. dollar increments.  This approach 
differs from the standard grouping by population top-income percentiles.  Hence the percentages of the population used differ 
somewhat from the usual round percentiles found elsewhere.  More percentiles are examined because of the greater detail of 
the data compared to the sources available for Canada and Germany. 
Generally, the Dagum model predicts the percentile corresponding to a given income reasonably 
well for Canada and New Zealand, usually within 1 point, and often much less. 
For these two countries, the fit of the estimates of average income within the percentile is poorer.  
Close to the top 10th percentile the fit tends to be somewhat better, but we notice a general 
deterioration as we move farther to the right in the distribution.  The predictions are consistently 
lower than the observed value, which means that the amount of revenue lost predicted with these 
methods may be lower than what would truly be observed. 
The models fail to give useful predictions for Germany, in large part because the estimate for the 
Pareto α is less than 1.  Since we use the formula zm = ż•α/(α-1) to calculate average income, we 
obtain negative values, which have no economic meaning. 
In summary, the preceding examples show that where the coefficients are reasonable (most 
obviously that Pareto α > 1), the models can provide useful information.  They give at least rough 
approximations to the average incomes of those in the right tail of the income distribution.  
However, to obtain closer estimates of average incomes, it is better to estimate the model based on 
data from farther to the right of the income distribution than the 10th percentile.  Unfortunately, 
many data sources do not enable us to do so. 
At the very least, using the techniques outlined in this section allows us a general examination of 
revenue potential in a wider range of countries. 
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5. THE IMPACT OF EXCLUDING CAPITAL GAINS FROM INCOME MEASURES 
A) Introduction 
A possible confounding factor in estimation techniques of the E.T.I. discussed in section 2 is the 
common practice of omitting capital gains from definitions of income (whether capital gains are 
included in the definition of income used to calculated effective marginal tax rates is not addressed 
in articles dealing with this topic).  This income definition is then used in time series or panel data 
regressions to estimate elasticities. 
If the responsiveness of capital gains realizations to changes in tax rates is different than that of 
other sources of income, the resulting measure of the E.T.I. will be biased.  When these E.T.I. 
estimates are used to estimate changes to revenue via changes in marginal tax rates, the results will 
also be inaccurate.  The problem becomes more serious the greater the percentage of national 
income generated via capital gains. 
The problem is all the more acute when the tax reform used for identification contains adjustments 
specific to the taxation of capital gains.  As an example, the major tax reforms in the U.S. during the 
1980s repealed a 60% exemption on capital gains realizations, while significantly lowering 
marginal tax rates for income in general.  This means that the taxation of capital gains increased 
substantially relative to that of other income such as dividends.  As a result, there was a large 
incentive to change the focus of investment portfolios from growth stocks to dividends, something 
which is not difficult for investors to do when institutional investors may not have the same tax 
incentives. 
Yet the definition of taxable income used in the E.T.I. studies of that period (Feldstein (1995), Auten 
and Carroll (1999), Gruber and Saez (2002), Saez (2004), etc.) does not include capital gains.  It 
does however incorporate dividends.  In the case of the 1986 tax reforms, post-reform increases in 
declared dividends will appear as increases in income via behavioural responses to lower tax rates.  
If without the tax reform such income would have instead come from capital gains, income shifting 
is misrepresented as income growth, and estimates of the E.T.I. will be biased upward. 
Auten and Carroll (1999) examine the statistical significance of dummy variables for having 
realized capital gains, as well as being subject to alternative minimum tax.  They conclude that since 
they chose not to include those subject to alternative minimum tax in the data sample used for their 
preferred E.T.I. estimates, any bias caused by the exclusion of capital gains from their definition of 
income will be minimal.  Their logic is that those with large capital gains realizations are subject to 
alternative minimum tax, and hence capital gains do not figure prominently in income declared by 
those in their samples. 
Due to its simplicity, this argument is far from conclusive.  Not distinguishing between those with 
capital gains of a few dollars as opposed to those with significant portions of their revenue coming 
from capital gains could be problematic.  The latter are likely to have higher incomes and much 
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larger incentives to adjust their portfolios.  Still, capital gains may not be a high enough percentage 
of their income for them to be subject to alternative minimum tax. 
Likewise, the self-employed often have the option to pay themselves in dividends or by selling stock 
in their companies.  Executives paid in stock options also have to report capital gains.  Yet such 
individuals will not necessarily be subject to alternative minimum tax calculations. 
Even assuming that the present value of all future capital gains realizations will be constant, 
significant inter-temporal shifting of capital gains to minimize tax liability could have significant 
impacts on the present value of all future government revenue. 
Further investigation of this issue would be very useful, yet because the taxation of capital gains 
usually changes concurrently with that of other income, identification is challenging. 
However, starting in the late 1980s in Canada, there were a series of changes to the inclusion rate of 
capital gains (the percentage of capital gains income which must be declared as income) which 
were not accompanied by changes to the federal marginal tax rate.  This scenario offers a valuable 
opportunity to isolate the response of individuals to changes in the taxation of capital gains. 
My approach is to perform a simple time series regression of total capital gains realizations in 
Canada on the inclusion rate of capital gains, controlling for the performance of the stock market.  
This technique follows such work as that of Saez (2004) and Milligan & Smart (2013). 
The regression model is as follows: 
cgrt = α + βinct + δ1Δstockt + δ2t + δ3t2 + εt                                                                               (8) 
Where: 
cgrt denotes capital gains realized in year t.  
α is the regression constant. 
inct is the inclusion rate in year t. 
Δstockt is the percentage change in the stock market in year t. 
 εt is the error term of zero conditional expected value.  
 
The models are estimated with and without linear and quadratic time trend controls, which can 
account for changes to investment strategies independent of taxes. 
The period covered is from 1972, when capital gains became taxable, to 2013, the latest year for 
which data are available. 
The issue of lagged responses to changes in the inclusion rate is discussed shortly. 
My preferred model has cgrt and inct in logarithmic form since β becomes the elasticity of capital 
gains realizations in terms of the inclusion rate. 
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Using Durbin-Watson and Dickey-Fuller tests suggests significant autocorrelation in the error 
terms, so Newey-West standard errors with 3 lags are presented in the results.  The choice of 3 lags 
is based on the standard formula g = 4(n/100)2/9, where n is the sample size and the number of lags 
is chosen to be the highest integer less than g (Newey & West (1987)). Hence 3 lags are optimal 
when the sample size is around 50. 
In what follows, I begin by presenting the available data, before turning to my results and several 
alternative specification models.  I conclude this section with a look at capital gains taxation across 
various countries in the O.E.C.D. 
B) Data 
Data on capital gains realizations and marginal tax rates come from the annual Taxation Statistics 
publication of Revenue Canada.  Data on other types of investment income come from Statistics 
Canada CANSIM tables 376-0013, 376-0012, and 376-0136.  Information on the performance of the 
Canadian stock market comes from the O.E.C.D. Financial Statistics database. 
Capital gains were not taxed before 1972, at which point the inclusion rate was set at ½.  It 
remained at this level until 1988, when it was raised to ⅔, before rising again to ¾ in 1990.  It 
stayed at this level until 2000, when it was progressively lowered throughout the year, with an 
average rate for 2000 of ⅔.  In 2001 it was lowered to ½, where it has remained since. 
Unfortunately, records of capital gains realized prior to 1972 are not publicly available, meaning 
that my model is unable to take advantage of a very interesting potential source of identification - 
the introduction of capital gains taxation in 1972. 
The federal top marginal tax rate has been reasonably stable since 1972, changing just three times:  
first, from 47% to 43% in 1976, then to 34% in 1982 and finally to 29% in 1988, where it stayed 
until 2016.  The changes of 1988 coincided with changes to the inclusion rate of capital gains, but 
the changes to the M.T.R. were minor in comparison to that of the inclusion rate.  Certainly, the U.S. 
M.T.R. changes of the 1980s were striking in comparison (from 50% to 28% on top incomes for the 
changes of 1986). 
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C) Results 
First, the primary factor affecting capital gains realizations is the performance of the stock market.  
The two factors follow each other quite closely, as is illustrated by figures 21 and 22: 
Figure 21 
Capital Gains Realizations and the Value of the Stock Market (Nominal Values) 
 
Figure 22 
Capital Gains Realizations and the Value of the Stock Market (Real Values) 
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Therefore in all regressions that follow, a control is included for the annual performance of the 
stock market based on data supplied by the O.E.C.D. 
Figure 23 shows the relationship between capital gains realisations and federal effective M.T.R.s on 
capital gains, respectively.  It is noticeable that capital gains realizations on the federal and Ontario 
levels follow similar paths, but on a different scale.  No immediate visual relationship is noticeable 
between capital gains realizations and M.T.R.s in either case: 
Figure 23 
National Capital Gains Realisations and Top Federal M.T.R. on Capital Gains (in real terms) 
Note that in figure 23 top marginal tax rates on capital gains refer to tax obligations including both 
the inclusion rate and marginal tax rate on taxable income.  
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Figures 24 and 25 show changes in nominal amounts of investment income, broken down by source 
(interest income on bonds, dividend income, and capital gains income).  Even in nominal terms, we 
see that interest income has been relatively flat, while both capital gains and dividends income have 
increased substantially.  This can be seen as justification for including time trends in the regression. 
Figure 24 
Stacked Breakdown of Components of Investment Income (Nominal Terms) 
 
Figure 25 
Stacked Breakdown of Components of Investment Income (Real Terms) 
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Figure 26 divides investment income per year into its components on a percentage basis, where the 
shift to dividend income is striking.  Although this has come primarily at the expense of interest 
income, the portion of capital gains decreases slightly as that of dividends grows, especially since 
the turn of the century.  This is further justification for including time trends. 
Figure 26 
Components of Investment Income in Percentages of Total 
 
Turning to the results of the regressions, in table 15 we see that unless we include a polynomial 
time trend, capital gains realizations are predicted to rise with the taxation of such income, which is 
counter-intuitive. 
Table 15 
Regression in Log Form of Capital Gains Realizations on the Inclusion Rate – Canada 
Standard Errors: Newey-West 
 
 Regression in Logs Regression in Logs with 
Linear Time Controls 
Regression in Logs with 
Polynomial Time Controls  
Coefficient 1.95 1.13 -0.59 
Standard Error 1.38 0.47 0.50 
t-statistic 1.41 2.41 -1.19 
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We see similar results if we lag the inclusion rate by one year, which is to assume that changes to 
investment strategies take a year to become apparent. 
Table 16 
Regression in Log Form of Capital Gains Realizations on a One Period Lag of the Inclusion Rate – 
Canada 
Standard Errors: Newey-West 
 
 Regression in Logs Regression in Logs with 
Linear Time Controls 
Regression in Logs with 
Polynomial Time Controls  
Coefficient 1.79 0.83 -0.70 
Standard Error 1.29 0.39 0.48 
t-statistic 1.38 2.12 -1.45 
 
Turning now to dividends, I examine the relationship of total dividends received by Canadians in 
the year with the inclusion rate on capital gains.  Without time trend controls, the estimates are of 
the expected sign, but not statistically different from zero.  The regression with a linear time control 
results in a positive and statistically significant estimate of the relationship between dividends and 
the inclusion rate in the year of the change.  The elasticity becomes negative when a quadratic time 
control is included, although with a very low t-statistic. 
Table 17 
Regression in Log Form of Received Dividends on the Inclusion Rate – Canada 
Standard Errors: Newey-West 
 
 Regression in Logs Regression in Logs with 
Linear Time Controls 
Regression in Logs with 
Polynomial Time Controls  
Coefficient 1.05 0.62 -0.21 
Standard Error 1.46 0.24 0.36 
t-statistic 0.72 2.56 -0.57 
 
As a first robustness check, I now turn to estimates of the coefficients on the elasticities of 
dividends and capital gains as before, but which now include up to 5 lags in the same regression 
model.  I also incorporate the method of Almon polynomial distributed lag models (Almon (1965)).  
Quadratic and cubic polynomials are used, with 3 and 5 lags.  Controls for time trends and the 
performance of the stock market are also included. 
Perhaps due to the small number of degrees of freedom, most estimates of the coefficients are not 
statistically significant.  
We generally notice little difference in the estimates of direct models versus those using a 
polynomial technique.  This is not entirely surprising, since even a degree 2 polynomial requires 3 
control variables, creating an advantage of just 2 degrees of freedom when using 5 lag models, and 
an advantage of just 1 degree of freedom when a 3 lag model is used. 
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Table 18 
Regression in Log Form of Capital Gains Realizations on Various Lags of the Inclusion Rate – Canada 
Polynomial Distributed Lag Model with Quadratic Time Controls 
Standard Errors: Newey-West 
 
Years of 
Lag of the 
Inclusion 
Rate 
Regular 
Regression 
with 3 
Lags 
Regular 
Regression 
with 5 
Lags 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with 3 Lags 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with 5 Lags 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with 3 Lags 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with 5 Lags 
0 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.19 
 (0.66) (0.75) (0.64) (0.42) (0.66) (0.68) 
       
1 0.39 0.20 0.32 0.05 0.39 0.04 
 (0.57) (0.69) (0.43) (0.10) (0.57) (0.47) 
       
2 -0.22 -0.25 -0.15 -0.10 -0.22 -0.10 
 (0.65) (0.57) (0.53) (0.26) (0.65) (0.46) 
       
3 -1.21 -0.20 -1.23 -0.24 -1.21 -0.23 
 (0.40) (0.44) (0.36) (0.26) (0.40) (0.17) 
       
4  -0.32  -0.39  -0.37 
  (0.50)  (0.11)  (0.33) 
       
5  -0.58  -0.54  -0.55 
  (0.37)  (0.39)  (0.41) 
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Returning to dividends, we notice an increase in dividends reported in the year of the change in 
inclusion rates, and this is often significant at even the 1% level.  However, we often see a large 
swing in the opposite direction in the year following the change in the inclusion rate.  It is not 
immediately clear what could explain this. 
A possible explanation is that in the 1990s (where most of the variation in inclusion rates used for 
identification takes place) there was a general trend by companies to reduce the payouts of 
dividends (Graham (2005)).   A summary of dividend payouts is presented in the appendix. 
Table 19 
Regression in Log Form of Received Dividends on Various Lags of the Inclusion Rate – Canada 
Polynomial Distributed Lag Model with Linear Time Controls 
Standard Errors: Newey-West 
 
Years of 
Lag of the 
Inclusion 
Rate 
Regular 
Regression 
with 3 
Lags 
Regular 
Regression 
with 3 
Lags 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with 3 Lags 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with 5 Lags 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with 3 Lags 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with 5 Lags 
0 1.75 1.57 1.47 0.82 1.75 1.17 
 (0.63) (0.54) (0.64) (0.31) (0.63) (0.56) 
       
1 -1.17 -1.18 -0.40 0.13 -1.17 -0.29 
 (0.54) (0.48) (0.51) (0.11) (0.54) (0.46) 
       
2 -0.07 -0.07 -0.83 -0.27 -0.07 -0.51 
 (0.81) (0.68) (0.55) (0.23) (0.81) (0.41) 
       
3 -0.11 0.51 0.18 -0.40 -0.11 -0.14 
 (0.60) (0.37) (0.50) (0.21) (0.60) (0.17) 
       
4  -0.78  -0.24  0.18 
  (0.33)  (0.08)  (0.39) 
       
5  0.20  0.19  -0.19 
  (0.32)  (0.38)  (0.36) 
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As a final robustness check, it is plausible that changes to the amounts of capital gains declared may 
take some time to appear, as the average investor may hold onto an investment for a certain period. 
It is estimated that the average holding period for an investment in the period from 1972 to 2000 
was anywhere from 2 to 5 years (Dela Croce, Stewart & Yermo (2011), Kleintop (2012), Haldane 
(2010)).  Therefore, I repeat the regression of capital gains realisations on the inclusion rate as in 
equation (8), but with a specific lag on the inclusion rate.  
Table 20 presents the results.   
Table 20 
Regression in Log Form of Capital Gains Realizations on Lags of Various Periods of the Inclusion Rate – 
Canada 
Standard Errors: Newey-West 
 
Years of Lag of 
Inclusion Rate 
Regression in Logs Regression in Logs with 
Linear Time Controls 
Regression in Logs with 
Polynomial Time Controls  
2 1.64 0.56 -0.92 
 (1.26) (0.38) (0.45) 
    
3 1.51 0.30 -1.06 
 (1.19) (0.36) (0.35) 
    
4 1.44 0.09 -1.09 
 (1.09) (0.35) (0.31) 
    
5 1.50 -0.03 -1.05 
 (0.98) (0.34) (0.32) 
 
Using a polynomial time trend control, we see that the estimates of the elasticity of capital gains 
realizations to the inclusion rate are now quite large, of the expected sign, and statistically 
significant at even the 1% level.  Importantly, they are an order of magnitude higher than standard 
estimates of the E.T.I. 
 
Without a polynomial time trend control, estimates are not statistically different from zero at any 
conventional significance levels, however.  
 
The idea that tax considerations do not impact investment decisions is quite counter-intuitive, 
hence we may expect the quadratic time control model best fits the underlying relationship. 
 
Importantly, if this is true, we notice a very large elasticity of capital gains realizations to the 
corresponding tax rate.  These results illustrate that excluding capital gains from measurements of 
income could significantly bias estimates of the E.T.I. downwards. 
 
Taking a moderate estimate of the E.T.I. for Canada such as 0.4 (Milligan & Smart (2014), and 
returning to figure 2, we see that even a 0.1 increase in the E.T.I. estimate is associated with more 
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than a 15 point increase in the percent of revenue gains lost to behavioural responses.  Since upper-
income individuals often have substantial percentages of their income derived from capital gains, 
the revenue-forecasting implications of this bias are quite alarming. 
 
To conclude this section, table 18 shows how many countries currently have significant tax 
incentives to focus portfolios toward capital gains.  It shows the top effective marginal tax rate on 
capital gains in a particular country minus that on dividends.  That is, the point difference between 
the two. 
 
E.T.I. estimates from those countries with large differences between effective marginal tax rates on 
capital gains and dividends could be especially susceptible to bias caused by the exclusion of capital 
gains from estimates of taxable income. 
 
Table 21 
Differences between Top Marginal Tax Rates for Dividends and Capital Gains by Country 
 
Country Difference Between Top M.T.R.s 
for Dividends and Capital Gains 
Australia 1.1 
Canada 5.7 
Chile 7.7 
Denmark 0.0 
Finland (8.4) 
France 4.3 
Germany 1.4 
Italy (32.0) 
Japan 0.0 
Korea 31.1 
Netherlands 25.0 
New Zealand 6.9 
Norway 0.0 
Spain (2.0) 
Sweden 0.0 
Switzerland 20.0 
United 
Kingdom 
8.1 
United States 0.0 
Note:  Brackets indicate tax advantage for dividends vis-à-vis capital gains 
Source: Carroll & Prante (2012), Ernst & Young LLP 
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6. MIGRATION RESPONSES TO CHANGES IN TAXATION 
A) Introduction 
Behavioural responses at the extensive margin may have an important impact on revenue 
collection, with common examples being migration and retirement. 
Surprisingly, the impact of taxation on migration trends has not been studied in great detail.  
Studies which have been published are summarized in section 2. 
Extensive margin responses such as migration are taken into account implicitly if the E.T.I. 
estimates are done via time series.  This is because the time series models look at total taxable 
revenue declared in the country, and changes to the rates of the exit or entrance of individuals will 
impact this revenue measure.  In order for these estimates to fully account for migration habits, we 
need the extra assumption that the average E.T.I. in the country is very nearly the same before and 
after any migration shift caused by a tax reform. 
However, the situation is much more complex when we turn to panel data.  Until now, no 
satisfactory model has been proposed which controls only for the component of migration or 
retirement planning which is a response to changes in taxation.  If this component is at all 
significant relative to other behavioural responses, estimates of the E.T.I. and expected revenue loss 
will be biased, most likely downward.  
To assess the likely magnitude of the problem, it is necessary to get a handle on exactly how 
responsive peoples’ residency choices are to taxation.  As previously mentioned, existing studies 
have found scant evidence of migration responses in general settings. 
An excellent potential source of identification on this issue is the movement of labour in the Nordic 
countries, where cultural ties are strong. 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have allowed free movement of labour among their 
countries since July 1st, 1954. There had already been bilateral agreements between countries prior 
to that date.  Full rights in terms of social security were established by 1957, while free movement 
of labour in the health services industry was finalized in 1967.  Pederson, Røed & Wadensjö (2008) 
provide a comprehensive summary of the evolution of these labour agreements.   
Until the 1970s, most migration within Scandinavia was from Finland to Sweden.  However, by that 
time the standard of living in Finland became more comparable to that of other Nordic countries, 
and the flow of migrants lessened. 
Norway, which had been a net supplier of migrants in the 1960s and 1970s, had become a net 
receiver by the 1990s. This coincided with the expansion of the oil based economy. 
Perhaps most advantageous in studying the Nordic countries is the high quality of available data. 
Migration data, in terms of both immigration and emigration between each pair of countries, has 
been made available since 1966 in the Yearbook of Nordic Statistics.  Additional pairwise migration 
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data for Sweden from 1946 onwards was published in Wadensjö (1974).  Information on marginal 
tax rates since 1956 comes from the O.E.C.D. tax database, as well as Statistics Norway and Du Rietz, 
Johansson & Stenkula (2013).  Information on population levels and GDP growth since 1950 comes 
from the O.E.C.D. demographic and economic database, Edvinsson (2011) and Norges Bank 
Occasional Papers No. 35 (Historical Monetary Statistics for Norway 1819-2003). 
A caveat is that for periods before 1970 there are discrepancies between data sources, particularly 
for calculations of all-in tax rates (those including social security contributions) and GDP growth.  
However, since these differences rarely exceed 5% in magnitude, it is unlikely that they invalidate 
the results, especially since the data covers an additional 43 years after that point, from 1970 to 
2013. 
Unfortunately, migration data is not divided by income levels.  Hence it is not possible to examine 
the migration responses of top earners in isolation from the rest of the population.  However, the 
cut-off to be in the top tax bracket is relatively low at less than $68,000.  Additionally, those with 
such incomes have the means to immigrate to other countries, whereas lower income individuals 
may not have the financial means to move comfortably.  Hence it is plausible that if there is a causal 
relationship between top tax rates and migration, a regression with the available data may be 
enough for identification. 
I focus on migration between Sweden and Norway due to their extremely close cultural ties, and the 
availability of data from 1956 onwards.  Results for migration between Denmark and Sweden 
produced similar results to that presented below, but I was only able to find data on marginal tax 
rates in Denmark from 1970 onwards.  The smaller sample size produced results that were 
significantly less precise than those presented here, but which allowed similar inference. 
The regression model is as follows: 
migt = α+ Σi(βiΔmtrt-i)+ δ1Δgdpt-1 + δ2t + δ3t2 + εt    i ϵ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}                        (9) 
Where:  
migt is a measurement of migration in period t.  It is defined as net migration, total immigration or 
total emigration from Sweden to Norway. 
Δmtrt-i is the difference in top marginal tax rates in period t-i between Sweden and Norway.   
Δgdpt-1 is the difference between GDP growth of Sweden and Norway in period t-1.    
α is the regression constant 
εt is the error term with a conditional expected value of zero in period t assuming correct 
specification of the model. 
 
I control for differences in GDP growth instead of differences in unemployment rates since 
measures of GDP tend to be more consistent across countries.  Incentives to return to the labour 
force vary greatly across countries, which impacts how many of those out of work are actively 
searching for a job and thus included in the unemployment rate.  These incentives have also varied 
greatly within countries during the period studied (Carling et al (1996), Scarpetta (1996)). 
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Autocorrelation of the error terms is again a concern, so all regressions are presented with Newey-
West standard errors, done with 3 lags. 
Lastly, as with the work on capital gains, Almon distributed polynomial lags are used as a 
robustness check.  
Figure 27 shows that visually there is no noticeable correlation between net migration rates and 
marginal tax rates: 
Figure 27 
Swedish Marginal Tax Rates and Net Nordic Migration 
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Figure 28 shows the same situation restricted to migration between Sweden and Norway: 
Figure 28 
Migration and Differences between Swedish and Norwegian Tax Rates 
 
Figure 29 shows the relationship between GDP growth and net migration from Norway to Sweden.  
Here, a closer relationship is visually evident, providing justification for controlling for G.D.P. 
growth in the regression model. 
Figure 29 
Migration and Differences between Swedish and Norwegian GDP Growth Rates 
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Figures 30 and 31 show the composition of Nordic migration to and from Sweden.  Whereas the 
Finnish used to account for a large share of the migrants, more recently the largest share has 
involved Norway. 
Figure 30 
Nordic Immigration to Sweden  
 
Figure 31 
Nordic Emigration from Sweden  
 
 
 
Note that data on migration does not specify citizenship of migrants, only which country they lived 
in and where they moved to.  Hence the large exodus of residents of Sweden to Finland in the early 
70s was likely driven by the Finns who moved to Sweden in the late 60s returning home. 
These trends provide justification for controlling for time trends in the regression. 
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B) Results 
Unless specifically stated, linear and quadratic time trend controls are significant at the 1% level in 
all regressions that follow. 
References to top tax rates mean the top marginal rate in effect in each country. 
For models involving net migration from Norway to Sweden, individual statistical significance 
appears only for lags of 4 and 5 years of the difference in marginal tax rates, with the signs of the 
estimates opposite to what we expect.  That is, higher relative top tax rates in Sweden are predicted 
to increase immigration from Norway to Sweden after a period of 4 to 5 years. 
This could be explained by the fact that migration rates do not distinguish between income classes.  
For instance, any exodus of high income individuals from Sweden could be masked by a greater 
influx of low to middle income Norwegians attracted by an expanding social security system. 
In terms of polynomial methods and the net migration model, the large differences in estimates 
compared to a regular regression indicate that the polynomial technique has introduced large bias, 
which is usually because the polynomials do not fit the data well.  Focusing exclusively on the 
standard errors, the polynomial technique of degree 2 is somewhat successful at increasing 
precision, whereas the degree 3 polynomials do not even provide significant improvements in this 
sense. 
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Table 22 
Regression in Levels of Net Migration from Norway to Sweden on the Difference in Top Tax Rates 
and Almon Distributed Polynomial Lag Technique 
1956 to 2013 
 
Years of 
Lag of the 
Difference 
in Tax 
Rates 
Regular 
Regression 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Regular 
Regression 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
0 -52.07 -51.78 -10.18 -10.38 -47.33 -47.19 
 (30.84) (31.80) (43.26) (41.66) (30.45) (30.56) 
       
1 -0.29 -0.0056 -26.16 -26.25 8.24 8.86 
 (68.87) (68.26) (13.25) (13.15) (31.03) (29.26) 
       
2 41.25 42.01 -25.70 -25.76 -4.71 -4.30 
 (45.12) (48.17) (16.26) (17.37) (13.18) (13.71) 
       
3 -99.98 -99.82 -8.79 -8.93 -29.72 -29.55 
 (70.59) (71.92) (18.34) (20.98) (33.07) (34.25) 
       
4 42.45 42.77 24.56 24.25 -10.28 -9.80 
 (28.10) (28.54) (11.02) (17.40) (31.00) (34.30) 
       
5 95.16 97.38 74.36 73.78 110.08 112.07 
 (39.93) (40.99) (29.69) (31.63) (52.44) (50.02) 
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Table 23 presents the sum of the effects from each year of lag, which can be seen as the total effect 
on net migration of an increase in the relative taxation of high income individuals in Sweden.  The 
units of measurement are individual migrants.  All results show an increase in the net flow of 
migrants from Norway to Sweden, although of a very small magnitude.  The same table presents 
95% confidence intervals, which show that the probabilities of large-magnitude changes in net 
migration rates due to modest to intermediate changes in tax policy are small. 
 
Table 23 
Responsiveness of Net Migration from Norway to Sweden to the Difference in Top Tax Rates 
Period of 5 Years  
(Measured in Number of Migrants with a 95% Confidence Interval) 
 
 Regular 
Regression 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Regular 
Regression 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
5 year 
effect 
26.5 30.6 28.1 26.7 26.3 30.1 
       
S. D. 31.6 50.5 33.9 48.6 32.3 49.2 
       
Conf. 
Int. 
(-35.4, 88.4) (-68.4, 129.5) (-38.4, 94.6) (-68.5, 122.0) (-37.1, 89.6) (-66.4, 126.6) 
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Looking at total migration from Norway to Sweden, we see little evidence of any impact from 
changes in relative taxation over 5 year periods.  Signs of coefficients tend to switch unexpectedly, 
but very few of the estimates are significant at the 10% level, and none are significant at the 5% 
level. 
The polynomial technique applied to this model has similar issues to that of the net migration 
model.  None of the polynomial techniques substantially increase precision.  Yet the degree 3 
polynomials tend to be more comparable with the regular regressions in terms of the magnitudes of 
the estimates of coefficients, whereas the degree 2 polynomials often lose almost all precision. 
Table 24 
Regression in Levels of Total Migration from Norway to Sweden on the Difference in Top Tax Rates 
and Almon Distributed Polynomial Lag Technique 
1956 to 2013 
 
Years of 
Lag of the 
Difference 
in Tax 
Rates 
Regular 
Regression 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Regular 
Regression 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
0 -46.74 -44.39 -6.03 -2.19 -41.89 -40.71 
 (28.41) (28.25) (36.83) (33.08) (25.21) (24.39) 
       
1 19.37 21.68 -6.42 -4.76 26.79 31.97 
 (59.70) (58.54) (9.07) (8.35) (34.48) (32.32) 
       
2 58.96 65.03 -4.71 -3.41 15.54 19.05 
 (40.72) (40.08) (12.41) (12.98) (14.7) (14.62) 
       
3 -88.49 -87.16 -0.91 1.85 -21.11 -19.73 
 (67.60) (68.69) (15.3) (17.57) (31.03) (31.98) 
       
4 22.32 24.88 4.97 11.02 -28.65 -24.61 
 (25.37) (24.51) (8.29) (13.66) (32.16) (35.59) 
       
5 32.88 50.68 12.95 24.11 47.43 64.17 
 (41.67) (31.69) (22.1) (16.69) (50.66) (40.9) 
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In terms of total effects over the 5 year period, we see once more through the confidence intervals 
that the total magnitude of impacts on immigration rates of Norwegians to Sweden is almost 
certainly low.  This implies that rates of taxation do not figure prominently among factors affecting 
decisions to move from Norway to Sweden. 
Table 25 
Responsiveness of Immigration from Norway to Sweden to the Difference in Top Tax Rates 
Period of 5 Years  
(Measured in Number of Migrants with a 95% Confidence Interval) 
 
 Regular 
Regression 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Regular 
Regression 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
5 year 
effect 
-1.7 30.7 -0.2 26.6 -1.9 30.2 
       
S. D. 35.9 36.5 37.6 35.2 36.1 36.4 
       
Conf. 
Int. 
(-72.0, 68.6) (-40.9, 102.3) (-73.9, 73.6) (-42.3, 95.6) (-72.7, 68.9) (-41.1, 101.4) 
 
Switching to emigration from Sweden to Norway, we again notice little impact of a substantial effect 
of rates of taxation.  Magnitudes of coefficient estimates from regular regressions are all low, and 
the only ones which are statistically significant at conventional levels are those of the 5 year lag 
term, which are of the opposite sign to what we expect. 
We do however see a noticeable improvement of the estimates of the polynomial technique for the 
model analysing migration from Sweden to Norway. The estimates are similar to those via a regular 
regression, meaning the bias introduced by imposing the polynomial relationship on the data 
appears to be much less than in the previous two models.  Additionally, the t-statistics are larger in 
absolute value (though not necessarily significant at even the 10% level), meaning that the 
polynomial technique has succeeded in at least improving precision.  The coefficients are positive 
for lower lags, but only those of a degree 2 polynomial technique for the coefficient of a 1 year lag 
are significant at even the 5% level.  They mostly become negative as the lag length increases.  Still, 
the magnitude of the coefficients in absolute value is small in all cases. 
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Table 26 
Regression in Levels of Total Migration from Sweden to Norway on the Difference in Top Tax Rates 
and Almon Distributed Polynomial Lag Technique 
1956 to 2013 
 
Years of 
Lag of the 
Difference 
in Tax 
Rates 
Regular 
Regression 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Regular 
Regression 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
0 5.33 7.39 4.15 8.19 5.44 6.48 
 (20.57) (21.65) (14.03) (15.77) (20.3) (21.17) 
       
1 19.67 21.69 19.74 21.49 18.55 23.12 
 (20.45) (19.64) (7.97) (8.34) (13.59) (13.31) 
       
2 17.71 23.02 20.99 22.35 20.26 23.35 
 (27.83) (29.52) (11.94) (12.52) (14.72) (15.33) 
       
3 11.49 12.66 7.87 10.78 8.6 9.83 
 (20.65) (21.16) (11.21) (12.38) (11.88) (12.15) 
       
4 -20.13 -17.89 -19.59 -13.23 -18.38 -14.81 
 (22.69) (23.76) (6.85) (11.14) (12.21) (14.15) 
       
5 -62.28 -46.70 -61.41 -49.68 -62.65 47.9 
 (20.52) (24.03) (16.83) (23.61) (18.9) (23.86) 
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Table 27 shows that total effects on migration from Sweden to Norway over the 5 year period are 
predicted to be quite modest, and of the counter-intuitive sign.  This is especially surprising, as 
increased immigration of middle to low income Norwegians cannot be an explanation for low 
responsiveness in the case of total emigration from Sweden to Norway following a top tax rate 
increase in Sweden. 
One possibility is that improved social security programs in Sweden reduce the numbers of middle 
class Swedes moving to Norway. 
Perhaps a more credible explanation is that high income Swedes may move their assets out of 
Sweden while remaining residents of the country.  This can be either through legal means 
(transferring income to non-resident trusts or moving a corporation’s activities to a lower-tax 
district) or illegally hiding income offshore in tax havens.  Such financial strategies could 
significantly reduce the sensitivity of residency decisions to taxation policies, while still resulting in 
large elasticities of taxable income for high earners. 
Table 27 
Responsiveness of Emigration from Sweden to Norway to the Difference in Top Tax Rates 
Period of 5 Years  
(Measured in Number of Migrants with a 95% Confidence Interval) 
 
 Regular 
Regression 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Regular 
Regression 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Degree 2 
Polynomial 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with linear 
time trend 
control 
Degree 3 
Polynomial 
with 
quadratic 
time trend 
control 
5 year 
effect 
-28.2 0.2 -28.2 -0.1 -28.2 0.1 
       
S. D. 15.2 41.9 14.6 40.3 14.8 40.7 
       
Conf. 
Int. 
(-57.9, 1.5) (-81.9, 82.3) (-56.8, 0.3) (-79.1, 78.9) (-57.1, 0.7) (-79.8, 79.9) 
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Table 28 highlights the difficulty in rejecting the hypothesis that there is no response at all of 
migration decisions to changes in top tax rates when using traditional regression methods.  The 
only scenario where we can reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level is with Swedish emigration 
and a linear time control variable included in the regression, but even then, the estimate of the 
coefficient is of the opposite sign to what we would expect. 
Table 28 
Responsiveness of Migration from Sweden to Norway  to the Difference in Top Tax Rates 
P-Values for Null Hypothesis: No Impact During a 5 Year Period 
 
  Linear Time Trend Control Quadratic Time Trend Control 
Net Migration 0.0772 0.1648 
Immigration 0.3595 0.1943 
Emigration 0.0047 0.2543 
 
We therefore have no new evidence to suggest a bias due to the exclusion of migration in estimates 
of the E.T.I. done with panel data.  This is broadly in line with the results on this topic published in 
the past, as summarized in section 2. 
Even taking a value such as a drop in net migration of 80 people, which is at the high end of the 95% 
confidence intervals which have been constructed, we do not see appreciable amounts of lost 
revenue.  Assuming a marginal tax rate of 60% and $250,000 of annual revenue taxed at the top 
marginal tax rate, a country such as Sweden would only lose $12,000,000 in revenue each year due 
to emigration.  This is the equivalent of less than $2 per citizen and far less than the extra income 
generated by the tax increase. 
If evidence is not forthcoming in the case of Norway and Sweden, two countries with very strong 
social, cultural and economic ties which publish an abundance of data, it is difficult to imagine it 
being easier to find in other geographical regions using similar forms of data. 
However, in a scenario where migration data were differentiated by income class, results of similar 
regressions as those presented here could be much more informative. 
In the absence of such detailed data, a more effective approach to studying responses at the 
extensive margin and the flight of capital following tax increases would be to look at various 
sheltering techniques readily available to high income individuals.  Such studies may stand a much 
better chance of quantifying the extensive margin responses of taxable income to changes in 
marginal tax rates. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
We have seen how important an understanding of behavioral responses is in policy planning.  Yet 
accurately estimating the E.T.I. which describes such responses is quite difficult.  Even a change in 
the elasticity by half a point has drastic impacts on revenue collection. Large amounts will be lost to 
behavioral responses as people reduce their taxable income following a tax hike. 
However, it is becoming increasingly clear that most reactions of taxable income following a change 
in marginal tax rates occur through the tax base.  This is reflected in the results of this thesis on 
capital gains and migration.  Taxpayers are quick to rearrange their investment portfolios to take 
advantage of preferential tax rates, but no evidence has been found showing a tendency to 
physically relocate their residence due to tax considerations.  
Chetty et al (2011) states that 60% of Danish taxpayers have no tax deductions at all.  Furthermore, 
as illustrated in section 3, studies have consistently found very low estimates of the E.T.I. in 
Denmark.  The situation in other Scandinavian countries is similar.   Additionally, marginal tax rates 
in these regions are quite high, and kick in at relatively low income levels. 
Hence by broadening the tax base as much as possible, the E.T.I. will almost certainly fall.  Revenue 
forecasting would then be much easier and far more accurate, since the E.T.I. is so difficult to 
estimate correctly.  Accompanying such reforms by cuts to marginal tax rates could make the 
changes revenue neutral.  
It would be very useful to develop regression models which can better control for the tax base.  
Having a detailed comparison of measures of the tax base across the countries studied in this thesis 
would also be of great interest. 
 
It would also be quite informative to examine how changes to average tax rates affect behavioral 
responses, as such rates are much harder to calculate.  Such a model would necessarily have to 
incorporate payroll and sales taxes, which are substitutes for individual income taxes in terms of 
revenue collection for the government.  Yet all contribute to how much disposable income a citizen 
truly has. 
 
Lastly, migration data differentiated by individual income would allow a much more precise study 
of migration habits of the wealthy following tax changes.  Such results would not be confounded by 
possibly opposing migration of other income classes. 
 
It is certain that with the current budgetary difficulties of governments across the globe, further 
research on this topic is more pertinent than ever. 
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APPENDIX 
A) Technical Specifications of Estimating the E.T.I. 
What follows are explicit statements of the three most popular regression models for obtaining 
estimates of the E.T.I.  Unless otherwise stated, the articles do not include discussions of the 
properties of the error terms of the regressions. 
 
Also, notation is listed so as to match that of the original articles. 
 
The first model is that which was proposed for panel data by Auten & Carroll (1999), who start 
with: 
 
log(Yit) = 1i + γt + αtXi + β log(1-τit) + errorit                (A1) 
 
Where: 
Yit is the income of individual i in period t 
1i is an individual-specific effect 
γt is a time-specific effect 
Xi is a set of individual characteristics that do not change over time, but whose relationship to 
income may change over time.  This is reflected by the αt coefficients. 
1-τit is the net-of-tax rate for individual i in period t. 
The error term has a conditional expected value of zero assuming the rest of the model is correctly 
specified. 
  
Taking first differences of (A1) yields: 
 
Δlog(Yi) = Δγt + ΔαXi + βΔlog(1-τi) + εit                                                 (A2) 
 
where Δ denotes the change in a variable between period t and t–1, and the error term εit has a 
conditional expected value of zero. 
 
The tax rate τi is estimated using the TAXSIM calculator, maintained by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research.  This is the standard tax rate calculator when working with data from the U.S. 
 
As stated above, the instrument for the change in the net-of-tax rate is what the net-of-tax rate 
would have been in period t had income in period t-1 only increased by the amount of inflation.  
Lastly, a taxpayer’s income in period t-1 is usually included as a control variable to account for 
mean reversion and broad income trends. 
 
The estimate of β in (A2) is the E.T.I. 
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The second standard model for panel data is a slight variation on the first, proposed by Gruber & 
Saez (2002): 
 
log(zi2/z i1) = α0 + ϑ log[(1-T ’ i2(z i2))/(1-T ’ i1(z i1))]  
+ η log [(z i2 – T i2(z i2))/ (z i1 – T i1(z i1))] + α1 log(z i1) + Σk α2ikmarsik  
+ Σj α3jYEARj + Σl α4lSPLINEl(zi1) + εit                                                               (A3) 
 
Where: 
zit is before tax income in period t for individual i. 
T ’ it(z it) is the marginal tax rate in period t for individual i. 
T it(z it) is the total income tax paid in period t for individual i. 
z it – T it(z it) is the after tax income in period t for individual i. 
marsik is a set of marital status dummies in the base year. 
YEARj denote base year dummies. 
SPLINEl(zi1) denotes a 10-piece spine in log first period income, where the l-th spline varies along 
with log income inside of the l-th income decile, and is constant outside that interval. 
ϑ is the compensated elasticity of taxable income (which therefore measures the substitution 
effect). 
η is the income effect parameter. 
εit is the error term, mean zero under correct specification assumptions. 
 
In particular, the spline is an effort to control for income trends and mean reversion. 
 
The equation is then estimated by 2SLS using log[(1-T ’ ip(z i2))/(1-T ’ it(z i1))] and  
log [(z i1 – T i2(z i1))/ (z i1 – T i1(z i1))] as instruments. 
 
Here, T’p is the marginal tax rate in year t faced by the taxpayer if his income did not change in real 
terms from period t-1.  The indexing using p is a convention introduced by the authors.  Hence this 
instrument is the same concept as that used in equation (A2). 
 
In practice it has been shown that η is not statistically different from zero, so equation (A3) is often 
simplified to 
 
log(zi2/z i1) = α0 + ϑ log[(1-T ’ i2(z i2))/( 1-T ’ i1(z i1))] + α1 log(z i1)         
+ Σkα2ikmarsik + Σj α3jYEARj + Σl α4lSPLINEl(zi1) + εit                                                      (A4) 
 
As is shown later in this section, studies emulating the techniques of Gruber & Saez (2002) have 
used either equation (A3) or (A4), depending on whether the purpose of the study was to examine 
income effects along with substitution effects.  Studies are categorized accordingly in table 3. 
 
Since there are many controls, it is necessary to have access to a set of panel data containing 
multiple years in order to avoid destruction of identification.  Gruber & Saez (2002) use stacked 
73 
 
observations from nine pairs of years (11 consecutive years of data and three years difference in 
the pair, so that t and t-1 are three years apart), and present estimates that correct the standard 
errors in case of individual-specific correlation in how incomes change over time.  Also, the authors 
weight all estimates by income to reflect the relative contribution to total revenues. 
 
Their estimate for the E.T.I. ϑ is 0.40, as opposed to the 0.55 found by Auten & Carroll.  They also 
find an estimate of the elasticity of broad income with respect to the net-of-tax rate of 0.12. 
 
Finally, the third commonly used regression technique comes from the aforementioned Saez (2004) 
and simple time-series regressions involving time trend controls.  Specifically, Saez relies on 
aggregate data released annually by the I.R.S. since 1960 in place of traditional panel data.  The log 
of either income or income shares is regressed on the log of the net-of-tax rate along with time 
trends (linear, quadratic and cubic).  Standard errors are Newey-West with 8 lags.  Endogeneity of 
the log of net-of-tax rate is overcome via the log of one minus the top marginal income tax rate as an 
instrument.  He uses as income A.G.I. (adjusted gross income, which is total gross income less 
specific deductions) minus capital gains, as opposed to taxable income.  Taxable income is therefore 
adjusted gross income less allowances for personal exemptions and itemized deductions.  Saez’s 
estimate for the E.T.I. for the American population as a whole is a statistically insignificant 0.2. For 
the top 1% of the income distribution he estimates a statistically significant E.T.I. value of 0.5. 
 
The results of Saez (2004) vary substantially by decade.  In periods such as the 1960s when the tax 
base was broader, the E.T.I. estimates are low.  Similarly, during periods such as the late 1970s and 
1980s when more deductions were available, E.T.I. estimates tend to be higher.  This lends further 
credence to the arguments of Kopczuk (2005) and how the tax base affects the value of the E.T.I. 
 
Holmlund & Soderstrom (2011) introduced a forth model for making long-term predictions, which 
has to date not been widely used. 
 
They specify a regression model as 
 
yit =α + β1nit +β2nit−1 + Xitγ1 + Xit−1γ2 +ρyit−1 +θi + εit                                        (A5) 
 
Where:  
yit is log income.  
nit ≡ ln(1−τit) is the log of the net-of-tax rate. 
τit is the marginal tax rate.  
Xit is a vector of other regressors.  
θi is an individual-specific fixed effect. 
εit is a random error term with mean value 0. 
i indexes individuals. 
t indexes years.   
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The short-run E.T.I. is given by β1 and the long-run E.T.I. is given by (β1 +β2)/(1−ρ), where ρ ∈ (0, 1) 
is thought to hold.  This last expression is valid when yit = yit-1 in the steady state, which will be 
reached if there are no other factors which exert influences on reported taxable income and 
therefore prevent income from becoming stationary. 
 
Some of the source articles include additional variations on estimations techniques for the E.T.I. 
which warrant further mention: 
 
i) Canada 
 
The research in Canada has focused principally on data at the provincial level, since there have been 
few changes in federal tax rates. 
 
Gagne, Nadeau & Vaillancourt (2001) use provincial tax rates to calculate very high values for 
E.T.I.s.  They find evidence of very high elasticities of even total income, not just taxable income.  
They argue that tax revenues can be increased by reducing tax rates (i.e. a Laffer response).  This is 
especially interesting because they find estimates in excess of 1 for even the middle classes, and 
almost 2 for the higher classes.  
 
Milligan & Smart (2013) find that cross-province tax shifting accounts for about two thirds of the 
total E.T.I. to unilateral provincial tax changes.  They find that almost all of the reaction to changes 
in tax rates is from the top 1% of the population, with general E.T.I.s in the neighbourhood of 0.5 to 
1 for this group.  Trusts account for a large portion of this income shifting, rather than physically 
moving.  Their 2014 paper estimates the E.T.I. for the top earning 1% of the population more 
precisely, with a value of 0.664. 
 
It is interesting to note that the data they used and their identification hypotheses are similar to 
Gagne, Nadeau & Vaillancourt (2001), but the estimates are much smaller.  Part of the reason is 
likely the different regression tools used in the studies, which for Gagne, Nadeau & Vaillancourt 
(2001) were ‘Seemingly Unrelated Regression’ (S.U.R.E., as introduced in Zellner (1962)), followed 
by a Prais-Winsten transformation and a second, iterative S.U.R.E. regression. 
 
Milligan & Smart (2014) instead use a time series regression of the form 
 
log(σpt)= β0 + e log(1-τpt) + β1log(TotIncomept)+ δp + λt + νpt                          (A6) 
 
Where:  
log σpt is the natural logarithm of the top one percent share of income. 
e is the elasticity of interest.  
log(1-τpt) is the logarithm of the net-of-top-tax rate.  
log(TotIncomept) is the natural logarithm of total provincial income.  
δp is a set of provincial fixed effects. 
λt is a set of time period fixed effects. 
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νpt is the error term.   
p indexes provinces, and t indexes years.   
 
This is similar to the model presented in Saez (2004).  They also weight the data by provincial 
population, following techniques introduced in Solon, Haider & Wooldridge (2015). 
 
ii) New Zealand 
 
Carey et al (2015) propose alternative instruments for the net-of-tax rate.   
Whereas the afore-mentioned standard instrument involves assuming that income just prior to a 
tax reform would have remained the same without changes to the tax code, Carey et al propose 
estimating parameters to model changes to income at various points along the income distribution 
during years without tax reforms.  They then use these parameter estimates to model how pre-tax 
reform income is expected to behave without any tax changes.  The tax rate that would have applied 
to the individual without changes to the tax code can then be used as an instrument. 
They propose a second alternative instrument which estimates an expected tax rate.  They begin by 
calculating the mean and variance of log income for individuals who had a specified income in past 
years.  With estimates of such means and variances, they calculate the probability of an individual 
being in each of the possible post-reform marginal tax brackets based on her pre-reform income.  
Each probability is multiplied by the marginal tax rate associated with that bracket. They then add 
all of the products to obtain the expected tax rate of an individual.  1 minus this expected tax rate 
can be used as an instrument for the marginal net-of-tax rate. 
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B) Selected Data 
Table A1 presents the most relevant data used in the regressions of section 5.  In particular, we can 
see that the amounts of dividends received in the 1990s, even in nominal terms, are somewhat flat 
compared with other periods.  1997 is an obvious exception, though this was not close to years 
where the inclusion rate on capital gains changed.  This could explain the counter-intuitive results 
of the relationship between dividends and lags of the capital gains inclusion rate found in section 5.  
Table A1 
Reference Totals and Percentage Changes for Total Amounts  
of Investments Received Nationally and Inflation  - Canada 
 
Year Interest 
(Billions 
CDN $) 
Interest 
Increase 
(%) 
Dividends 
(Billions 
CDN $) 
Dividends 
Increase 
(%) 
Capital 
Gains 
(Billions 
CDN $) 
Capital 
Gains 
Increase 
(%) 
Inflation 
(%) 
1972 1.1 0.0 0.5 32.4 0.3 15.7 5.0 
1973 1.8 63.6 0.6 22.2 0.5 6.3 7.5 
1974 2.7 50.0 0.6 7.3 0.6 -14.7 11.0 
1975 2.5 -7.4 0.7 10.2 0.8 -2.3 10.7 
1976 2.3 -8.0 0.6 -12.3 1.3 2.4 7.5 
1977 2.6 13.0 0.7 19.3 1.5 -3.4 8.0 
1978 3.6 38.5 1.1 61.8 2.4 14.3 9.0 
1979 5.9 63.9 1.2 9.1 4.1 34.4 9.1 
1980 6.2 5.1 1.3 8.3 5.5 34.9 10.1 
1981 9.1 46.8 2.3 76.9 4.7 3.4 12.5 
1982 9.6 5.5 2.4 4.3 2.7 -25.0 10.8 
1983 8.0 -16.7 2.5 4.2 4.1 44.4 5.9 
1984 9.6 20.0 3.1 24.0 4.0 0.0 4.3 
1985 8.7 -9.4 3.9 25.8 5.7 14.4 4.0 
1986 8.0 -8.0 4.1 5.1 9.0 11.2 4.2 
1987 8.2 2.5 4.0 -2.4 14.6 20.2 4.4 
1988 8.4 2.4 7.3 82.5 12.8 -8.7 4.0 
1989 9.9 17.9 4.9 -32.9 17.0 15.1 5.0 
1990 12.0 21.2 4.8 -2.0 11.1 -9.6 4.8 
1991 10.0 -16.7 5.6 16.7 10.8 1.4 5.6 
1992 8.3 -17.0 5.4 -3.6 12.0 -1.7 1.5 
1993 7.7 -7.2 7.0 29.6 19.0 14.5 1.9 
1994 10.0 29.9 6.6 -5.7 18.2 9.9 0.2 
1995 14.0 40.0 7.1 7.6 10.0 3.4 2.1 
1996 14.0 0.0 7.9 11.3 13.1 18.8 1.6 
1997 15.0 7.1 12.0 51.9 17.5 22.7 1.6 
1998 15.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 17.9 4.7 1.0 
1999 14.0 -6.7 11.0 -8.3 19.0 4.5 1.7 
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2000 17.0 21.4 12.0 9.1 29.8 37.3 2.7 
2001 14.0 -17.6 9.7 -19.2 16.2 -19.8 2.5 
2002 9.6 -31.4 13.0 34.0 13.7 -9.2 2.3 
2003 8.4 -12.5 12.0 -7.7 16.8 0.9 2.8 
2004 9.2 9.5 14.0 16.7 22.5 20.7 1.9 
2005 13.0 41.3 19.0 35.7 31.8 17.6 2.2 
2006 19.0 46.2 28.0 47.4 38.6 18.4 2.0 
2007 21.0 10.5 31.0 10.7 43.9 13.9 2.1 
2008 19.0 -9.5 32.0 3.2 24.8 -8.4 2.4 
2009 14.0 -26.3 26.0 -18.8 20.8 -18.6 0.3 
2010 13.0 -7.1 28.0 7.7 29.3 18.8 1.8 
2011 13.0 0.0 29.0 3.6 31.0 7.4 2.9 
2012 15.0 15.4 29.0 0.0 28.1 -6.7 1.5 
2013 16.0 6.7 32.0 10.3 32.8 5.4 0.9 
Note: Data source was in Canadian dollars rounded to the  nearest billion, meaning that 0% changes indicate only that there 
were no differences in the data for the two years in question, not that there was 0 growth in the amounts received. 
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Tables A2 and A3 present the migration and tax data used in the regressions of section 6.  Table A4 
presents corresponding G.D.P. data. 
Table A2 
Migration Rates between Nordic Countries 
 
Year Sweden Denmark 
Immigration 
Sweden Denmark 
Emigration 
Sweden Norway 
Immigration 
Sweden Norway 
Emigration 
1956 6572 2234 2335 1450 
1957 5599 2434 2291 1444 
1958 3661 2791 1752 1423 
1959 2492 3456 1708 1283 
1960 2695 3316 2281 1187 
1961 2695 3115 2364 1293 
1962 2411 2686 2090 1451 
1963 2990 2160 2155 1397 
1964 2783 2463 2582 1449 
1965 2831 2150 3600 1572 
1966 2556 2386 3158 2037 
1967 1869 1986 2072 2177 
1968 2725 2173 2210 2397 
1969 3261 2224 2650 1924 
1970 3609 3397 2837 2602 
1971 2431 3403 2258 2969 
1972 2126 3070 1996 3209 
1973 2357 3383 2286 2671 
1974 7142 2134 2515 2414 
1975 11507 4535 2815 2237 
1976 3996 4912 2639 2194 
1977 2572 4154 2180 2498 
1978 2000 3577 1749 2482 
1979 2134 2890 2118 2085 
1980 2521 2366 2018 2268 
1981 1881 2248 1661 2412 
1982 1635 2215 1766 2536 
1983 1578 1797 2501 2159 
1984 1654 1912 3122 2118 
1985 1742 1914 2627 2550 
1986 1820 1930 2852 3180 
1987 1816 1730 3416 3738 
1988 2952 1688 4905 3823 
1989 5081 2459 10623 3170 
1990 3719 3142 8620 5016 
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1991 2226 3026 3339 5271 
1992 1803 2574 2643 4688 
1993 1718 2357 2126 4677 
1994 2379 2377 2562 4388 
1995 2354 2628 2674 4383 
1996 2021 2742 2589 4908 
1997 1627 2671 3015 7093 
1998 1927 2445 4293 7765 
1999 2194 2196 5496 5912 
2000 2996 2084 6577 4955 
2001 3564 2247 6287 4421 
2002 4250 2241 6374 4404 
2003 4603 2585 5807 4391 
2004 4674 3024 4884 4211 
2005 5008 3341 4317 4445 
2006 6432 3456 4489 5018 
2007 6615 4307 4714 6006 
2008 5605 4754 5055 7206 
2009 5457 5144 5097 7188 
2010 4962 5195 6372 8846 
2011 4583 4856 7455 9753 
2012 4011 4471 6705 7379 
2013 3676 5015 6220 6934 
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Table A3 
Marginal Tax Rates across Nordic Countries 
 
Y 
e 
a 
r 
Swed. 
lower tax 
rate 
Swed. 
middle tax 
rate 
Swed. top 
tax rate 
Nor.  
Lower 
tax rate 
Nor. 
Middle 
tax rate 
Nor.  top 
tax rate 
Denmark 
top tax 
rate 
52    42.1 50.2 69.5  
53    42.4 51.1 70.9  
54    42.7 51.4 73.1  
55        
56 29.1 32.9 41.3     
57 29.3 33.5 40.6 43.0 54.1 76.4  
58 30.1 35.3 41.3 43.0 56.3 78.2  
59 31.6 38.2 41.7 40.8 47.4 76.0  
60 32.0 38.5 41.9 40.8 47.6 76.0  
61 32.3 38.8 45.6 40.8 49.4 76.1  
62 34.9 39.0 45.8 41.3 53.4 76.9  
63 35.1 39.1 50.1 44.6 55.3 77.2  
64 35.9 43.9 50.7 45.3 55.3 77.2 50.4 
65 36.4 42.1 51.2 41.3 51.3 73.2 50.6 
66 38.8 42.7 52.9 41.2 41.2 73.2  
67 43.3 46.4 53.4 45.2 45.2 73.2  
68 44.1 47.1 54.0 46.3 48.3 69.2 61.0 
69 44.7 47.7 55.3 34.8 41.2 64.5  
70 45.2 48.2 55.8 31.0 37.2 53.5  
71 35.9 47.3 60.6 35.0 42.0 54.0 62.0 
72 42.8 57.7 61.8 36.0 45.0 54.1 64.0 
73 40.1 62.3 61.9 37.0 54.0 56.0 65.0 
74 43.9 63.2 62.0 40.0 50.0 68.2 64.0 
75 47.2 58.2 73.2 38.0 43.0 69.7 65.0 
76 48.2 64.2 75.2 37.0 48.0 69.4 66.0 
77 41.9 62.9 75.9 30.0 41.0 69.4 67.0 
78 41.7 59.7 77.7 32.0 38.0 73.4 67.0 
79 45.0 62.0 78.0 38.0 48.0 73.4 68.0 
80 43.1 59.1 82.1 38.0 48.0 72.8 69.0 
81 43.6 55.6 82.6 32.0 38.0 70.7 69.3 
82 43.7 58.7 82.7 32.3 38.3 70.8 69.0 
83 40.2 53.2 75.2 33.3 37.3 69.3 74.3 
84 37.3 53.3 70.3 33.3 36.8 63.8 72.5 
85 34.4 50.4 65.4 33.2 36.2 61.9 71.8 
86 45.3 50.3 70.3 33.8 36.8 68.8 71.5 
87 43.4 50.4 70.4 33.4 36.4 67.4 72.1 
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88 50.6 50.6 75.6 34.2 44.2 63.2 72.6 
89 47.8 47.8 72.8 34.5 34.5 62.0 72.9 
90 41.2 55.2 66.2 33.8 43.8 59.3 72.6 
91 34.3 34.3 51.2 34.3 41.8 57.8 72.6 
92 34.1 34.1 51.0 30.2 35.8 49.5 73.2 
93 34.8 34.8 51.0 30.2 35.8 49.5 73.2 
94 35.5 35.5 51.1 30.2 35.8 49.5 69.7 
95 37.4 37.4 56.5 30.2 35.8 49.5 68.1 
96 38.2 35.0 56.7 30.2 35.8 49.5 66.0 
97 38.9 35.7 56.7 30.2 35.8 49.5 65.8 
98 38.6 35.6 55.8 30.2 35.8 49.5 64.2 
99 39.7 36.6 50.6 29.9 35.8 49.3 64.3 
00 38.3 35.2 50.4 35.8 35.8 49.3 63.3 
01 37.2 34.2 50.5 35.8 35.8 55.3 62.9 
02 36.0 32.9 50.5 29.4 35.8 55.3 62.4 
03 35.5 35.5 51.2 29.1 35.8 55.3 62.3 
04 35.9 35.9 51.5 29.1 35.8 55.3 63.0 
05 35.4 35.4 51.6 27.1 35.8 51.3 63.0 
06 34.8 34.8 51.6 26.3 35.8 47.8 63.0 
07 31.6 31.6 51.6 26.3 35.8 47.8 63.0 
08 30.4 30.4 51.4 26.3 35.8 47.8 63.0 
09 29.5 29.5 51.5 26.3 35.8 47.8 62.8 
10 28.6 28.6 51.6 26.3 35.8 47.8 56.1 
11 28.6 28.6 51.6 26.3 35.8 47.8 56.1 
12 28.6 28.6 51.6 26.3 35.8 47.8 56.1 
13 28.7 31.7 51.7 26.3 35.8 47.8 56.2 
Note: Blank spaces represent years where data were not available. 
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Table A4 provides data used on GDP growth rates in the Nordic nations. 
Table A4 
GDP Growth Rates across Nordic Countries 
 
Year Denmark GDP Growth Norway GDP Growth Sweden GDP Growth 
1956  12.8 3.2 
1957  6.8 2.8 
1958  0.4 2.1 
1959  6.4 4.1 
1960  -2.6 5.4 
1961 6.4 6.3 5.7 
1962 5.7 2.8 4.3 
1963 0.6 3.8 5.3 
1964 9.3 5.0 6.8 
1965 4.6 5.3 3.8 
1966 2.7 3.8 2.1 
1967 3.4 6.3 3.4 
1968 4.0 2.3 3.6 
1969 6.3 4.5 5.0 
1970 2.0 2.0 6.7 
1971 2.7 4.6 0.6 
1972 5.3 5.2 2.4 
1973 3.6 4.1 4.2 
1974 -0.9 5.2 3.2 
1975 -0.7 4.2 2.7 
1976 6.5 6.8 0.4 
1977 1.6 3.6 -1.5 
1978 1.5 4.9 2.0 
1979 3.5 4.4 4.0 
1980 -0.4 4.6 1.4 
1981 -0.9 1.6 -0.2 
1982 3.0 0.2 1.2 
1983 2.5 4.0 1.9 
1984 4.4 6.1 4.3 
1985 4.3 5.6 2.2 
1986 3.6 4.0 2.8 
1987 0.3 1.8 3.4 
1988 1.2 -0.3 2.6 
1989 0.2 1.0 2.7 
1990 1.0 1.9 1.0 
1991 1.3 3.1 -1.1 
1992 2.0 3.6 -1.2 
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1993 -0.1 2.8 -2.0 
1994 5.5 5.1 4.1 
1995 3.1 4.2 4.0 
1996 2.9 5.0 1.5 
1997 3.3 5.3 2.9 
1998 2.2 2.6 4.2 
1999 2.9 2.0 4.5 
2000 3.7 3.2 4.7 
2001 0.8 2.1 1.6 
2002 0.5 1.4 2.1 
2003 0.4 0.9 2.4 
2004 2.6 4.0 4.3 
2005 2.4 2.6 2.8 
2006 3.8 2.4 4.7 
2007 0.8 2.9 3.4 
2008 -0.7 0.4 -0.6 
2009 -5.1 -1.6 -5.2 
2010 1.6 0.6 6.0 
2011 1.2 1.0 2.7 
2012 -0.7 2.7 -0.3 
2013 -0.5 0.7 1.2 
2014 1.1 2.2 2.3 
Note: Blank spaces represent years where data were not available. 
 
